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ABSTRACT 
  Rote use of a standard-form contract term can erode its meaning, a 
phenomenon made worse when the process of encrustation introduces 
various formulations of the term. When they occur, rote usage and 
encrustation weaken the communicative properties of boilerplate 
terms, leading some terms to lose much, if not all, meaning. In theory, 
if a clause is emptied of meaning, it can create a contractual black hole 
in which, as the term loses meaning, random variations in language 
appear and persist. What, then, are the consequences if parties exploit 
these variations in language by successfully advancing an interpretation 
the market disavows? Traditional doctrine holds that even if the court 
errs in the meaning it gives to a clause, parties have an incentive 
promptly to revise the standard language to exclude the aberrant 
interpretation. But what if the assumptions about the costs and 
motivations to revise this type of boilerplate are wrong? We seek 
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purchase on this question with a study of the pari passu clause, a 
standard provision in sovereign debt contracts that almost no one 
seems to understand. This clause gained fame in 2011 because of a 
series of court decisions in New York arguably misinterpreting a 
particular variation of the clause. Even though the courts’ 
interpretation put at risk a multitrillion dollar debt market, meaningful 
revisions to the language of the boilerplate term did not begin to appear 
until late 2014. In the interim, trillions of dollars in bonds were issued 
with an uncorrected version of the term. Market forces, in other words, 
worked slowly to remedy a systemic problem that caused substantial 
costs. We ask whether the state could do more to avoid the problem at 
the front end rather than depend on market forces to correct court error 
at the back end. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A question that courts face whenever they are asked to interpret 
a standard provision in a commercial contract is how to determine what 
the parties understood that provision to mean when they contracted. 
The interpretive goal in contract cases is to recover and then enforce 
the parties’ apparent intentions, as they existed at the time of 
contracting. This goal implies that courts will attempt to interpret even 
ambiguous terms in a manner consistent with the ex ante intentions of 
the contracting parties in so far as a court can recover those intentions 
from the contract or the surrounding context.1 But standardized terms 
in boilerplate contracts between sophisticated parties are vulnerable to 
misinterpretation. At the limit, a boilerplate term that is reused for 
decades and without reflection merely because it is part of a standard-
form package of terms, can be emptied of any recoverable meaning: 
this creates a contractual black hole.2 More commonly, terms that have 
 
 1. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 
YALE L.J. 541, 568–69 (2003). Intention is “determined objectively and prospectively: A party is 
taken to mean what” a “contract partner could plausibly believe it meant when the parties 
contracted.” Id. at 569. As the arbiter of disputed interpretations, the court determines the 
meaning of whatever signals of intention the parties agreed to. While the court presumably knows 
what the default rules it implies in every contract mean, it does not know the intended meaning 
of those terms that were chosen by the parties. 
 2. The concept of the black hole derives from theoretical physics. Stephen Hawking’s work 
on black holes suggested that no “information” can escape from a black hole—once it is pulled 
past the event horizon, it is lost. Horizon: The Hawking Paradox, BBC Two television broadcast 
(Sept. 15, 2005). In the sense we use the concept here, the parties’ original understanding of what 
a clause meant can, in theory, be lost entirely by the process of repetition and the insertion of 
random variations: once drawn into a black hole, it is lost forever. In the last two years, however, 
Hawking has decided that he was wrong and while some information can escape, it is so degraded 
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lost much meaning still may provoke litigation over essentially 
meaningless variations in the boilerplate language. In this latter case of 
contractual grey holes,3 courts may be functionally incapable of 
devising a plausible meaning that was attached to the linguistic 
variations at the time the contract was drafted. Thus, regardless of 
whether a boilerplate term has lost all or only almost all meaning, 
courts will face an interpretation conundrum that we collectively term 
the “black hole” problem.4 
The dilemma that courts sometimes face when interpreting 
boilerplate is an inherent cost of the reliance on standardized contract 
terms in commercial contracts. Boilerplate terms are ubiquitous in 
commercial contracting because they offer the efficiency advantages of 
standardization. Those advantages include the development of a 
uniform system of communication that is independent of any particular 
contractual context.5 Thus, parties in heterogeneous environments who 
 
as to be virtually useless. See David Castelvecci, Physicists Split by Hawking Paper, 529 NATURE 
448, 448 (2016) (noting that Hawking’s recent paper “suggest[s] a mechanism for transferring 
[some] information to the black hole”); Clara Moskowitz, Stephen Hawking Hasn’t Solved the 
Black Hole Paradox Just Yet, SCI. AM. (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/stephen-hawking-hasn-t-solved-the-black-hole-paradox-just-yet [https://perma.cc/QD6K-
5Z6Y] (quoting Hawking as stating “[t]he information about the ingoing particles is returned but 
in a chaotically useless form”). This, then, is the “grey hole” concept. See infra note 3 and text 
accompanying notes 18–42. 
 3. David Dyzenhaus has distinguished the different characteristics of legal black holes and 
grey holes. See generally DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A 
TIME OF EMERGENCY 41–42 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006). In his terms, grey holes are situations 
where “there are some legal constraints . . . but the constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty 
well permit [an actor] to do as it pleases.” Id. at 42. A black hole, in contrast, does not even 
pretend to constrain. It is a “lawless void.” Id. at 41. Thus, in the sense we use here, the contractual 
black hole is the limiting case of a boilerplate term that lacks any meaning whatsoever. A grey 
hole, in contrast, cannot excuse all possible meanings, but the meaning that has survived is 
incapable of providing a basis for making legal distinctions among the variations in language that 
have appeared over time. Id. at 42. Thus, even for grey holes, where some evidence on the 
meaning of the contractual term remains, this evidence may be so minimal or contradictory as to 
leave courts effectively with little guidance on how to apply this meaning in litigation. Since the 
interpretive issues are the same with both black and grey holes, we use the generic term “black 
hole” to refer to the range of problems caused by the loss of contextual meaning. 
 4. Douglas Baird, in analyzing this question, uses the term “skeumorph.” See Douglas G. 
Baird, Pari Passu Clauses and the Skeumorph Problem in Contract Law, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 
(forthcoming Oct. 2017). 
 5. Standardized terms provide a uniform, and therefore intelligible, system of 
communication. See, e.g., Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801–03 
(1941) (describing the “channeling function” of legal formality). This standardizing “function is 
analogous to governmental provision of regulated standards of weights, measures and generic 
product names,” and it offers contracting parties “similar communicative advantages.” Charles J. 
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between 
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 286–88 (1985). 
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wish to communicate a shared intent can embody that intent in a fixed 
and reliable formulation whose meaning does not vary with the nature 
of the contract or its context.6 Unfortunately, the very elements of fixed 
and unchanging meaning that make boilerplate terms attractive are the 
same elements that can lead to the process of repetition without 
reflection that contributes to the erosion of that meaning over time. 
In addition to the ordinary risks of obsolescence, the repetitious 
use of boilerplate has two pernicious effects that can undermine the 
utility of some boilerplate terms. The first effect is “rote usage”: some 
standardized terms may get used by rote so consistently that they lose 
a shared meaning and become a ritualized legal incantation.7 
“Encrustation” is a second cost of too much repetition: the 
intelligibility of language deteriorates significantly as legal jargon is 
added to standard formulations, leading to linguistic variations of the 
same clause.8 This process further weakens the communicative 
properties of boilerplate terms, reducing even more their reliability as 
signals of what the parties really meant.9 In combination, terms that 
develop linguistic variations and thereafter are repeated by rote, even 
after the original meaning has been largely lost, can become 
contractual black holes. 
Contractual black holes present a heightened risk that courts may 
be persuaded to adopt an interpretation of the term at issue that is 
antithetical to the functioning of a market that relies on the standard 
contract to regulate the rights and duties of the participating parties. 
The market may have disregarded the term before a court gives the 
black hole a contemporary interpretation. Nonetheless, the market 
may have an understanding of what the term does not mean, often 
 
 6. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048–51 (2d Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983) (discussing the importance of boilerplate language in 
successor obligor clauses); Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981) (“A large degree of uniformity in the language of debenture 
indentures is essential to the effective functioning of the financial markets: uniformity of the 
indentures that govern competing debenture issues is what makes it possible meaningfully to 
compare one debenture issue with another . . . .”); see also Howard S. Steel, Elnaz Zarrini & 
Arkady A. Goldinstein, NML Capital v. Argentina: A Lesson in Indenture Interpretation, 8 
INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING INT’L 31, 32 (2014) (discussing the uniformity in pari passu 
clauses).  
 7. For a description of black holes and the rote usage phenomenon, see infra text 
accompanying notes 19–32. 
 8. The eminent British lawyer, Philip R. Wood, has described the process of encrustation 
as akin to that of barnacles accumulating on a ship’s hull. PHILIP WOOD, ALLEN & OVERY LLP, 
LIFE AFTER LEHMAN: CHANGES IN MARKET PRACTICE 9 (2009). 
 9. Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, at 289; see infra text accompanying notes 19–32. 
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because of the high cost to market participants of an aberrant 
interpretation. Unfortunately, correcting the courts’ interpretation in 
such a case can be a slow and difficult process, even when the judicial 
error imposes high costs. This resistance to revision is a function of 
what we will call the “evidentiary vacuum” that results when a term 
loses its original meaning and lacks an evidentiary record of its 
contemporary meaning. Here the chance of a court issuing an aberrant 
interpretation is heightened as compared with a boilerplate term with 
a well-known meaning. 
These conditions appear to describe the case of the pari passu 
clause, a boilerplate formulation common to sovereign debt contracts 
for nearly 200 years whose contemporary meaning was hopelessly 
unclear.10 The recent history of judicial interpretation of this clause 
began in Brussels in a case against the Republic of Peru in September 
2000, in which a court issued the first interpretation of the clause in at 
least a half century.11 The same interpretation of pari passu was 
affirmed by a federal court in New York in a case against the Republic 
of Argentina in December 2011,12 and affirmed again on appeal in that 
same case in October 201213 and August 2013.14 In each of these cases, 
the courts endorsed an interpretation of a particular variation of pari 
passu that required holdout creditors to be paid in full as a condition 
to the sovereigns paying consenting creditors under a restructuring 
agreement. Even though this interpretation effectively undermined 
efforts by sovereigns to restructure their bonds, and even though the 
courts’ interpretation was widely vilified in the market, meaningful 
revisions to the language of the boilerplate term did not even begin to 
appear until late 2014.15 
The extent of rote usage and encrustation in commonly used 
boilerplate remains an open question because the issue is only now 
 
 10. MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: 
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACTUAL DESIGN 3, 51–52, 109–18 (Univ. of Chicago 
Press 2013) (describing the almost universal ignorance of market participants as to the purpose 
and meaning of the pari passu clause in sovereign bond contracts). 
 11. For an English translation of the Brussels case, see Joint Appendix at A-1356, NML 
Capital, Ltd. V. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 12-105(L)).  
 12. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978, 2011 WL 9522565, at *2–
3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011). 
 13. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 14. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013).  
 15. See generally Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Variation in Boilerplate: 
Rational Design or Random Mutation, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (reporting 
on data concerning the use of pari passu clauses after June 2011). 
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beginning to be examined by legal and economic scholars.16 But 
preliminary evidence from other markets where standard form 
contracts are ubiquitous suggests that the pari passu saga is 
representative of a larger phenomenon, extending beyond sovereign 
bond contracts to other contexts where boilerplate is commonly used, 
including insurance and merger and acquisition agreements.17 To the 
extent this problem exists more broadly, it argues for a shift in contract 
doctrine away from the futile and ultimately costly effort to discover a 
shared meaning that no longer exists.18 In this Article, we explore 
whether courts, or other state actors, might better deal with contractual 
black holes in boilerplate contracts. Our purpose is to begin the 
scholarly focus on the effects of this phenomenon by using the pari 
passu story as a prototypical exemplar. We use both qualitative and 
quantitative data to support the claim that courts searching for shared 
intent in the case of black holes in standardized contracting can result 
in substantial social costs. 
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we focus on identifying 
the causes and effects of black holes in standard form commercial 
 
 16. In addition to the pari passu term, there are other terms in sovereign bonds themselves, 
such as the negative pledge clause, that may well have become black holes. One can also find such 
potential black holes elsewhere, such as the tax revenue pledges that underlie many municipal 
bonds in the United States. Insurance contracts appear to be another area with the potential for 
such terms. See Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance Policies as Noncontracts: An 
Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique Financial Instruments, 89 TEMP. 
L. REV. 535, 547–48 (2017) (describing conditions ripe for the generation of black holes). French 
explains: 
Many of the terms and conditions contained in standard form ISO [Insurance Service 
Office, Inc.] policies were drafted many years ago and are reused each time ISO issues 
new versions of the policy form. For example, the policy language in the 1943 New 
York Standard Fire Insurance Policy is still used today in some homeowners’ insurance 
policies. Because much of the standard form policy language used today was drafted 
long ago, the original drafters are often dead or unknown. Documentation regarding 
the drafters’ intent also rarely exists. Consequently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
discern the drafters’ intent if the policy language is ambiguous.  
Id. at 547–48.  
 17. A number of forthcoming papers, from an April 2017 conference on Contractual Black 
Holes, discuss the conditions under which black holes are more or less likely to occur. The papers 
are available at Contractual Black Holes, NYU POLLACK CTR. FOR LAW & BUS., 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/pollackcenterlawbusiness/events/contractualblackholes [https://
perma.cc/FK2J-DME7]. 
 18. The underlying canon of contract interpretation directs courts to give every term and 
clause in a contract a meaning, under the assumption that parties have drafted terms in a contract 
to convey their collective purposes. In NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, the Second 
Circuit put it this way: “A contract should not be interpreted in such a way as would leave one of 
its provisions substantially without force or effect.” NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 258 (citing 
Singh v. Atakhanian, 818 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)). 
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boilerplate. We show how both agency and coordination costs peculiar 
to the inertia that results from black holes can undermine the standard 
assumption that commercial parties will promptly revise an 
unanticipated interpretation that generates market inefficiencies. Part 
II frames the inquiry: Does the celebrated dispute over the meaning of 
the pari passu clause provide evidence that the current means of 
revising black holes impose large and uncompensated social costs? In 
Part III, we evaluate a dataset on pari passu clauses assembled from 
over 1500 sovereign and quasi-sovereign issuances in the period from 
June 1, 2011 to May 30, 2016, together with interviews with the 
participants in the market. Part IV discusses the implications of the 
finding that, at least in certain markets, commercial actors face 
extraordinary difficulties in repairing black hole boilerplate following 
what the market perceives as an aberrant judicial interpretation of the 
term’s contemporary meaning. These difficulties present a collective 
action problem whose solution can be daunting owing to the 
combination of coordination and agency costs that may impair the 
efficiency of standardized commercial contracting in large-scale 
markets. 
I.  WHEN STANDARDIZED CONTRACT TERMS BECOME ROTE AND 
ENCRUSTED 
We earlier introduced the concept of black holes in terms of two 
related but independent factors that contribute to the unintelligibility 
of standardized language. The first, rote usage, results when, despite 
many years of repetitive usage, no serious legal challenges or other 
methods of validation affirm the meaning of a routinely invoked term.19 
The absence of disputes over a widely used but poorly understood 
term, or of a collective process of updating the meaning of such 
standard terms,20 disables courts or other authoritative bodies from 
 
 19. The legal recognition of certain words and phrases preserves a reliable meaning to 
boilerplate terms. “Since the legal system retains ultimate power over interpretation and 
enforcement, parties cannot be certain what effect will be given to any formulation until it is 
tested.” Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, at 278. “Definitional recognition does not change the 
optional character of these terms,” but it “does confer upon them the status of ‘invocations,’ terms 
that once deliberately” included in a contract “have a legally circumscribed meaning that will be 
heavily—perhaps even irrebuttably—presumed.” Id. at 282. What ultimately can result from rote 
usage is a term that is widely used because market participants assume it must have a meaning, 
but, in fact, it does not. 
 20. An example of a collective effort to update standard terms is the International Chamber 
of Commerce’s publication of Incoterms, the international rules for the interpretation of trade 
terms. See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS (2010). Each of the eleven Incoterms 
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providing parties with a tested interpretation of the boilerplate term 
that minimizes the risks of unintended effects. Rote usage may also 
develop as a species of contractual overkill, for example, as in forms 
that designate already enforceable agreements as “signed and 
sealed.”21 In effect, these rote terms become platitudes.22 Nonetheless, 
the linguistic formulation continues to be retained and repeated 
because “parties see no reason to eliminate a term they view as costless 
and thus incur a risk, however small, of jeopardizing” the market’s 
understanding of their agreement.23 Encrustation is a second cost of too 
much repetition: the intelligibility of language deteriorates significantly 
as legal jargon and other linguistic variations are overlaid on standard 
formulations. Rote usage and encrustation are related phenomena 
although they may affect some boilerplate terms independently.24 
When combined in a particular clause or phrase, a term becomes 
linguistically uncertain, as no particular meaning can be uncovered that 
is more probable than any other meaning. 
It is important to distinguish the linguistic uncertainty that creates 
black holes from the more familiar interpretive challenges courts face 
when interpreting ambiguous terms. A term is ambiguous when it is 
“capable of more than one sensible and reasonable interpretation.”25 
Terms that are linguistically uncertain in the sense we use here are not 
ambiguous but rather are acontextual. The term in question can apply 
to an infinitely wide spectrum of referents, as opposed to one or more 
 
sets forth a number of substantive rules, including, most importantly, the point at which risk of 
loss passes from the seller to the buyer. Id. A contemporary example of updating comes from the 
International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA), whose rules, standard forms and definitions are 
continually revised by a standing committee. See Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Contract as 
Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1139–42 (2006) (explaining the emergence and activities of 
ISDA); Anna Gelpern, Public Promises and Organizational Agendas, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 57, 63–67 
(2009) (describing ISDA’s “contract-drafting and related activities”).  
 21. For a discussion of the deterioration of the sealed instrument from a prima facie signal 
of legal enforcement to a meaningless rote incantation, see ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, 
CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 141–43 (5th ed. 2013). 
 22. As Goetz and Scott explain: 
  Ordinary social relations are similarly replete with phrases that have lost their 
literal meaning through rote usage. The person who asks ‘How are you?’ usually does 
not mean to inquire about your health. Similarly, ‘Have a nice day,’ an unusual 
expression of friendliness a few years ago has now lost most of its meaning and become 
a ritual salutation from personnel in many retail establishments.  
Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, at 288 n.73. 
 23. Id. at 288. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Ross Bros. Constr. Co. v. State ex rel. Transp. Comm’n Highway Div., 650 P.2d 1080, 
1082 (Or. Ct. App. 1982). 
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reasonable alternatives, because there is no basis in the relevant 
context to determine what, if any, shared meaning exists. 
What, then, is the mechanism that produces an encrustation that 
is then repeated by rote in standard boilerplate? Those running the 
deals in standard markets describe the process in the following terms: 
Lawyers hired to do a deal for clients—such as a bond offering—are 
instructed to use market-standard forms so far as possible. But the 
deals have to be tailored to the client’s needs as appropriate. Names, 
dates, locations for payment, currencies, and other items have to be 
changed from whatever prior deal document is being used as a 
template. The client’s assumption is that the lawyers possess the 
expertise to make the necessary marginal modifications to the standard 
forms to insure that they both fit the client’s preferences and do not 
depart significantly from what the market would consider the standard 
package. But lawyers working with standard form language repeated 
for many years by rote are unlikely to have much, if any, understanding 
of the purpose served by these terms. The combination, then, of 
making marginal modifications to the contract terms to suit the needs 
of the transaction, coupled with ignorance of the terms’ function, can 
result in the insertion of legal language that attempts to, but ultimately 
fails at, adding clarity to the terms. These insertions may occur with 
greater frequency when the attorneys involved have less experience 
with the particular boilerplate term.26 
Encrustation thus results from adapting standard language whose 
contemporary meaning is unclear to the drafter. To be sure, 
emendations may occur in other contexts as well. But there are more 
error-correction mechanisms for those boilerplate terms that do have 
well understood meanings and frequent usage. Subsequent drafters 
that see a variation in an understood usage will be less motivated to 
repeat the variation if the earlier amendments have changed this 
meaning and usage in undesirable ways. Where a term has lost a shared 
meaning, however, and is repeated by rote simply as part of a standard 
package, these error-correcting mechanisms will not apply. This then 
leads to increasing uncertainty in the meaning of the variations in the 
boilerplate term. 
 
 26. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 73–118 (describing interviews with lawyers on 
both the issuer and investor sides regarding boilerplate drafting); cf. Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati 
& Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Why Are Sovereign Bond Contracts Sticky? A View From Government 
Debt Managers 8–27 (Duke Law Sch. Working Paper 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2984293 [https://perma.cc/R8D5-8PGV] (reporting on interviews 
with the debt managers and investors who hire the lawyers). 
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Indeed, the very popularity of a clause as part of the standard 
package of terms in a given indenture can increase even as the term 
becomes more encrusted and less understood.27 This phenomenon is 
propelled by information cascades. In an information cascade, 
followers might imitate the variation regardless of what they think of 
the merits of the choice as long as they believe there is some chance 
the earlier (or even only the first) movers might have had better 
information about the term’s intended meaning.28 Thus, one person’s 
tinkering can become contagious even when nobody else knows what 
the revision is supposed to mean. 
Ironically, because of rote usage, some clauses become enshrined 
on the standard checklist expected by market participants to be found 
in all contracts of a particular type or in a specific market.29 These 
checklists function as templates that reduce the learning costs for 
potential contracting parties: a list of essential elements for every 
standard deal facilitates comparisons across contract documents. 
Paradoxically, however, habitual reliance on standard templates also 
exacerbates the black hole problem. Once a term becomes an essential 
part of a package that signals a standard set of contractual rights and 
obligations, rote usage will increase, thereby accelerating loss of 
meaning.30 Rather than consider the underlying substance of a 
standard checklist, contracting parties may simply reproduce the terms 
reflexively. In this evidentiary vacuum, the chances of a court making 
an aberrant interpretation are increased as compared with a boilerplate 
term with well-known meaning. The market may have overlooked the 
function of a clause prior to litigation over its meaning. However, the 
market will thereafter develop views on how the court’s interpretation 
affects the parties’ contractual distribution of rights and obligations. 
 
 27. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 119–38 (describing this phenomenon in the context 
of the pari passu clause). 
 28. Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 AM. 
ECON. REV. 847, 847–48 (1997). We are grateful to Bert Huang for alerting us to this point. 
 29. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 75–76 (quoting senior lawyers); Gelpern et al., 
supra note 26, at 11 (noting that debt managers ask lawyers to “paper the deal” by insisting that 
all standard legal provisions are present). Market participants report the importance of satisfying 
expectations of the “checklist” in other contexts relating to sovereign bond issuances as well; even 
if the item on the list is itself meaningless. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Josefin Meyer & Mitu 
Gulati, The Sovereign Debt-Listing Puzzle 23–24 (Duke Law Sch. Working Paper 2017) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2853917 [https://perma.cc/R3XD-JSMW] 
(finding that “responses were virtually unanimous in describing the task of obtaining an exchange 
listing for an international bond issuance as a ‘check-the-box’ item”).  
 30. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 75–76.  
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And because a black hole had no meaning or function prior to the 
interpretation, the court’s interpretation will likely upset this 
distribution in unexpected and negative ways. 
The standard assumption among both commercial lawyers and 
legal academics is that the social costs of rote usage and encrustation 
are small because the costs of judicial error will be limited to the 
isolated case of an aberrant interpretation. This belief is supported by 
the reasonable assumption that sophisticated commercial parties can 
and are motivated to readily correct a court’s interpretive mistakes.31 
Indeed, given the important role that standardization plays in 
replicating boilerplate terms in tens of thousands of commercial 
contracts and the nontrivial possibility that a court may err in 
interpreting those terms that are infected with rote usage and/or 
encrustation, commercial parties have incentives to revise their 
standardized contract terms promptly to ensure that a common 
meaning is preserved. Thus, the theory predicts that “harmful 
heuristics, like harmful mutations in nature, will die out.”32 Leaving 
inefficient interpretations of encrusted boilerplate unrevised produces 
unacceptable levels of uncertainty and reduces the gains from 
contracting. 
But what if the assumption that markets evolve rapidly to repair 
inefficient interpretations of encrusted boilerplate is incorrect? It is, 
after all, an assumption based on little in the way of empirical or 
theoretical work on the production process of contracts.33 Indeed, there 
are well-documented circumstances where sophisticated commercial 
parties fail to react promptly to inefficient judicial interpretations. 
Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner have catalogued many sources of 
 
 31. For the classic discussions of the Darwinian process that will eliminate harmful mutations 
through capital structure and loan covenant contexts, see MERTON H. MILLER, Debt and Taxes, 
in 1 SELECTED WORKS OF MERTON H. MILLER: A CELEBRATION OF MARKETS 103 (Bruce D. 
Grundy ed., 2002) and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting, 7 J. 
FIN. ECON. 117, 123 (1979), respectively. 
 32. MILLER, supra note 31, at 103. 
 33. Scholars in contract law have largely ignored the study of how contracts are produced—
even though assumptions about contract production and revision underlie many doctrines of 
contract interpretation. But see generally Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient 
Evolution of Merger Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57 (2017) (exploring how certain 
contracts are created and evolve over time); Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (2011) (same); D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. Smith, Contracts as 
Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2009) (same); Kevin E. Davis, Interpreting Boilerplate (NYU 
Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Org., Working Paper No. 10–21, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1618925 [https://perma.cc/T9D2-TF9T] (same). 
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inertia that can delay revisions to standardized contracts.34 But 
encrusted boilerplate presents an even greater challenge to the 
standard assumption: here commercial parties may face unique inertia 
costs that explain why they are unable easily to convert the encrusted 
boilerplate into a new and intelligible formulation. In short, boilerplate 
that has devolved into a black hole may motivate inaction that lasts 
well beyond the ordinary time for market adjustments. 
Why might inertia costs be higher in the case of contractual black 
holes? Rote usage leads to a loss of shared meaning, both between the 
contracting parties and across time in the market. Over time, we 
theorize, encrustations introduce essentially random variations in the 
language of the boilerplate term: these variations are stripped of any 
context and thus they offer no means of distinguishing legal rights and 
duties among the different formulations.35 Because these random 
variations are harmless for long periods of time, they persist—at least 
until an adverse legal interpretation poses a systemic threat to the 
market.36 As the pressure then mounts to repair the damage caused by 
the black hole, parties confront a significant increase in the level of 
uncertainty across all the dimensions of inertia. Individual parties are 
reluctant to change the language of the disputed term because they 
cannot offer a plausible alternative to the aberrant interpretation. In 
addition, they are unsure how courts will respond to the changes they 
do make. Until the revised term is tested in litigation, there is 
uncertainty over how courts will interpret what had been an essentially 
“empty” term. Individual parties also may be reluctant to draft new 
contractual language in the evidentiary vacuum of a black hole because 
 
 34. For a discussion of the inertia costs that apply generally to standardized contracting, see 
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or 
“The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 728 (1997).  
 35. We use the term “random variation” in a specific sense: the initial change in the language 
of the boilerplate term was likely an intentional emendation by the agent charged with the duty 
of adapting the contract to particular client needs. But the lack of the error-correction 
mechanisms that exist in the case of variation of well-understood terms means that the durability 
of the linguistic variation is essentially random. 
 36. The metaphor here is the concept of punctuated evolution as popularized by 
paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould. The idea is that evolution does not select against 
characteristics that are harmless. The evolutionary process is triggered only by an event that 
makes the characteristic undesirable. See S.J. Gould & R.C. Lewontin, The Spandrels of San 
Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme, 205 PROC. 
ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON 581 passim (1979). See generally STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE 
OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY (Harvard Univ. Press 2002). In the context of this paper, the pari 
passu clause is not ripe for revision until holdout creditors persuade the federal district court in 
New York to adopt an interpretation that blocks an agreement to restructure Argentina’s debt. 
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the new clause may be used to show that the unrevised clauses in 
contracts that are still outstanding mean something different from the 
new clause. For example, change to the contract language that closes 
off holdouts in a newly issued bond might put unrevised clauses in prior 
bonds of that sovereign at greater risk of enabling holdouts. These 
“legacy” costs increase as does market uncertainty: changing a term 
thus poses the further risk that the standard indenture will be viewed 
as idiosyncratic, thereby increasing learning costs.37 
The reluctance to act in an evidentiary vacuum is greater when a 
contracting party moves unilaterally while other parties continue to use 
the existing boilerplate clause, even after a disfavored court 
interpretation. The uncertainty over the meaning of a black hole term 
coupled with the continued use of the term by others in the market 
heightens the risk that subsequent courts will view a unilateral revision 
of the clause as confirmation of the first court’s interpretation. In 
contrast, if the market as a whole moves promptly to change the 
contract language, it sends a clear signal rejecting the court’s 
interpretation of the black hole clause and affirming the market’s 
preference for an alternative interpretation. The black hole hypothesis 
predicts that change will not occur in a significant way until market 
participants, confronting a black hole term that the market historically 
has disregarded, are able to solve a vexing collective action problem 
and coalesce around a new industry standard. Once the collective 
forms, the inertia costs for individual actors are significantly 
diminished. But as we discuss below, the very uncertainty that deters 
unilateral efforts to revise black hole boilerplate also increases the 
coordination costs that make collective action, including the efforts of 
public institutions to assist the market in clarifying the term’s meaning, 
difficult to achieve.38 
 
 37. Learning costs are the costs parties must expend in learning the meaning of the clause. 
The prediction from the learning cost literature is that the older and more widely used a term 
becomes, the better is the common understanding of what it means. Kahan & Klausner, supra 
note 34, at 719–25, 730–33. See also Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, at 286–88 (explaining how 
standard terms provide benefits in terms of reducing errors of ambiguity, inconsistency, and 
incompleteness); Tina L. Stark, Introduction, in NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING CONTRACT 
BOILERPLATE 3, § 1.02 (Tina L. Stark, Lauren Reiter Brody & Frances Kulka Browne eds., 2003) 
(observing that provisions that have been used repeatedly develop a “hallowed status” and have 
been “blessed”). 
 38. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 40–41 (suggesting moral hazard incentives that 
motivate free riding by private parties on the assumption that the official sector will bear even 
greater costs if the terms are not revised). For further discussion of collective action problems, 
see infra Part IV.A. 
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The pari passu saga that we describe below illustrates the 
substantial social costs caused by aberrant interpretations of 
contractual black holes. These costs include the long-term 
consequences of failed efforts to restructure bonds owing to the large 
number of inefficient contracts containing a now-disfavored pari passu 
clause, and the cost of public efforts to overcome collective action 
problems and induce change in response to the judicial error. Given 
these costs, it may be misguided for contract doctrine to adhere 
stubbornly to the standard interpretive command to courts to find what 
the parties to the litigation meant by the black hole term. Instead, 
social welfare considerations may support interpreting black hole 
boilerplate terms infected by rote usage or encrustation in ways that 
reduce ex ante the ex post costs of an inefficient court interpretation.39 
II.  A PROTOTYPICAL EXAMPLE: THE PARI PASSU CLAUSE 
A. The Inquiry: Does the Market Repair Black Holes? 
Our normative claim that, in some cases, courts should abandon a 
search for party intent when interpreting certain boilerplate terms is 
often difficult to support empirically. Consider the case where a single 
court in one jurisdiction interprets a boilerplate term and, despite 
public outcry, the market continues to use the same unchanged term 
for years after the interpretation. Notwithstanding the public reaction, 
it will be challenging to discern whether, in fact, the market views the 
court as erring in its interpretation. If it is indeed the case that market 
actors do not react quickly to judicial error, all that an outsider 
observer sees is that the boilerplate terms in the contract have not 
changed. While the absence of revision may mean that the market is 
constrained in some way that impedes a prompt response to inefficient 
interpretations, the absence of revision is also consistent with the 
possibility that the court’s interpretation reduced hitherto 
unacknowledged inefficiencies in the standard form. In that case, the 
absence of a market-wide revision to the term in question would be a 
confirmation of the welfare benefits of the novel interpretation.40 
 
 39. See infra Part IV (discussing the implications of boilerplate). This method of thinking 
about contract interpretation techniques is articulated in Richard A. Posner, The Law and 
Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581 (2005). 
 40. This argument has been advanced in the case of the pari passu controversy by Marcel 
Kahan & Shmuel Leshem, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Debt: The Role of Contractual 
Ambiguity and Asymmetric Information (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal) and by Mark L. J. Wright, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Bond Contracts: 
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What evidence would be sufficient to support the claim that the 
market is peculiarly disabled from promptly revising or deleting a 
contractual black hole following an erroneous interpretation? Ideally, 
one would hope to see multiple courts across different jurisdictions 
interpreting an encrusted boilerplate term in a particular way, followed 
by numerous contracts written with the same unrevised term. To be 
sure, there are many sources of inertia that delay revisions to 
standardized contracts,41 but inaction that lasts well beyond the typical 
time for market adjustments42 justifies the inference that either 
contractual black holes are associated with extraordinary inertia costs43 
or the market is endorsing the prevalent court interpretation. 
But how can one then distinguish between these two plausible 
reasons for the lack of a market response? Suppose after an extended 
delay we do observe an eventual and wholesale revision in the language 
of the boilerplate that explicitly rejects the courts’ interpretation of the 
meaning of the black hole term. With multiple instances of judicial 
interpretation, particularly if the courts are taken as authoritative, 
researchers can more credibly dismiss the explanation that the 
interpretation from an aberrant court does not reflect the prevailing 
judicial view. And when the eventual changes to the clause expressly 
 
Evolution or Intelligent Design?, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 103 (2011). In another article, we test the 
“Rational Design” hypothesis and find little or no support for the claim that the failure to respond 
to the courts’ interpretation was a rational attempt to reduce moral hazard costs by precluding a 
subsequent restructuring. Choi et al., supra note 15, at 28–34. 
 41. See, e.g., GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 33–44 (providing an overview of the theories 
explaining the prevalence of contract boilerplate).  
 42. For a contrasting example of sovereign boilerplate that has been revised much more 
rapidly when impacted by the same external events, see generally Choi et al., supra note 15. 
 43. If in fact inertia costs peculiar to black holes do contribute to the extraordinary delay, 
then an inefficient interpretation of such a clause will impose additional social costs on the market 
as parties continue to write contracts that fail to maximize the joint gains from contracting. In the 
case of the pari passu clause, the extraordinary inertia costs cited by market players as 
explanations for inaction can be grouped in four distinct categories: (1) Legacy Debt Costs: A 
change to the contract language that closes off holdouts in cases involving a newly issued bond 
might put the unrevised clauses in prior bonds of that sovereigns at greater risk of enabling 
holdouts, if the court draws a negative inference about the meaning of the old clauses from the 
fact that there was a substantial change in the new issues. (2) Market Reaction Uncertainty: There 
will be uncertainty as to how investors will react to a new formulation of a commonly used clause, 
especially where the clause lacks a well-understood meaning in the market. (3) Idiosyncrasy 
Costs: Investors have a preference for the “standard” package of terms. Changing a term poses 
the risk that the bond will be viewed as idiosyncratic, thus increasing learning costs. (4) Legal 
Uncertainty: How courts will interpret the new term remains an uncertainty until the term is 
tested in litigation: the uncertainty is greater if the lack of a settled market understanding means 
that courts must interpret the clause in an an evidentiary vacuum. For a discussion of these 
concepts, see GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 73–108. 
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reject the prevailing judicial interpretation, researchers can dismiss the 
explanation that the market had endorsed the efficiency of the newly 
minted boilerplate. The foregoing conditions are, unsurprisingly 
perhaps, hard to find. However, the decade-long litigation between 
NML Capital, the hedge fund of the U.S. billionaire, Paul Singer, and 
the Republic of Argentina, has provided a natural experimental setting 
that allows us to test the market response to court decisions 
interpreting a boilerplate term: Is the delay in the market’s response 
more consistent with a rational meaning for the term or with a 
contractual black hole that impedes the ability of the market to react 
to a disfavored court interpretation?44 
B. The History of Pari Passu Litigation45 
To understand why an examination of the history of the pari passu 
clause offers a valuable natural experiment, one needs to return to 
litigation that occurred in 2000 involving NML’s predecessor, Elliott 
Associates, another hedge fund run by Mr. Singer. In that instance, 
Singer’s fund was pursuing the Republic of Peru on debt claims his 
fund had purchased at a deep discount.46 Obtaining a judgment against 
Peru for nonpayment of the debt was straightforward, as there was no 
dispute that Peru had not paid. Enforcement of the judgment proved 
much more difficult, as it always is with sovereign debtors, which is why 
defaulted sovereign debt trades at a deep discount on the secondary 
market. Elliott Associates had purchased discounted debt and sought 
to use its legal expertise, along with its unusually deep pockets, to 
recover in full from recalcitrant debtors so as to make a profit worthy 
of a hedge fund. As part of that endeavor, Elliott was chasing Peruvian 
assets in a variety of jurisdictions around the world, including Brussels. 
There, Elliott struck pay dirt: The commercial court in Brussels ruled, 
on an ex parte motion, that the version of the pari passu clause used in 
the Peruvian debt contracts47 meant that Peru could not pay any other 
 
 44. We take the standard sovereign bond contract that includes the ubiquitous pari passu 
clause to be prototypical, not representative, of boilerplate contracts of its type: Its elements are 
not those most frequently to be found in an empirical survey of standard form contracts with some 
encrusted terms. Rather, the standard contract contains the essential features that, in repeating 
boilerplate terms untested by litigation over long periods, define the category. In this sense, the 
sovereign bond contract is a prototype or central exemplar of a distinct class of contracts, in the 
way that robins and swallows are prototypes of birds, while chickens, ostriches and penguins, 
despite their many similarities to robins and swallows, are not. 
 45. The following Part draws from GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10. 
 46. This part draws on GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 12–17. 
 47. For a discussion of the pari passu variation used in the Peruvian debt contracts, see infra 
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creditors without paying Elliott a pro rata share.48 Further, the judge 
ruled that Elliott was entitled to an injunction against Euroclear, the 
Brussels-based financial clearinghouse, which would bar payments to 
the holders of restructured bonds (who were being paid in full on their 
restructured amounts) unless Elliott got its full payment on its 
unrestructured amount.49 
The international financial community reacted with alarm. The 
luminaries in the field uniformly condemned the decision as 
inconsistent with long-held market understandings of the meaning of 
pari passu. Whatever the clause meant, and no one was certain of its 
contemporary meaning, the experts asserted that everyone knew that 
it did not mean that all creditors must be paid pro rata, despite a 
restructuring agreement giving preference to consenting creditors.50 
But notwithstanding the dismay expressed in dozens of academic and 
policy articles,51 and even after a proposal for a new international 
bankruptcy court for sovereign debtors led by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF),52 for over a decade virtually no pari passu 
provisions in sovereign debt contracts were modified to clarify this 
 
note 93 and accompanying text. The English translation of pari passu is “in equal step.” The clause 
has been present in sovereign debt instruments since at least the early nineteenth century. See 
Benjamin Chabot & Mitu Gulati, Santa Anna and His Black Eagle: The Origins of Pari Passu?, 9 
CAP. MKTS. L.J. 216, 216–17 (2014); see also Pablo Triana, The First Foreign Sovereign Pari 
Passu? It’s All Scottish to Me (2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2662851 [https://perma.cc/ZP8L-SQWP] 
(describing a similar clause drafted in the 1800s). 
 48. See supra note 11. 
 49. For discussions of the Brussels case and its aftermath, see, e.g., Robert A. Cohen, 
“Sometimes a Cigar is Just a Cigar”: The Simple Story of Pari Passu, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 15–
17 (2011) and Manuel Monteaguodo, Peru’s Experience in Sovereign Debt Management and 
Litigation: Some Lessons for The Legal Approach to Sovereign Indebtedness, 73 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 201, 208–10 (2010). 
 50. E.g., Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt 
Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 876 (2004); Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, To Rank Pari Passu or 
Not to Rank Pari Passu: That is the Question in Sovereign Bonds after the Latest Episode of the 
Argentine Saga, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AMS., 745, 769 (2009); Charles G. Berry, “Pari Passu” 
Means What Now? N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6, 2006, at 1. 
 51. See, e.g., Patrick Wautelet, Vulture Funds, Sovereign Debtors and Creditors, in 
INSOLVABILITE DES ETATS ET DETTES SOUVARINES 103, 142 (Matthias Audit ed., 2011) (“While 
it was unanimously decried by commentators, who expressed surprise at the interpretation 
accepted by the Court of Appeal, the decision of the Court of Appeal was seen as a blessing by 
the community of sovereign debt creditors which had until then not paid much attention to the 
pari passu clause.” (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted)). 
 52. See Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, Int’l Monetary Fund, A New 
Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Nov. 26, 2001), http://www-personal.umich.edu/ 
~kathrynd/IMFDebtRestructuring.Krueger.pdf [https://perma.cc/H78S-BUUB]. 
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understanding.53 The same version of the pari passu clause that had led 
to the supposedly unsupportable decision in Brussels was used over 
and over again for a decade in literally hundreds of contracts.54 
What explains this disjunction? The same law firms whose senior 
lawyers were declaiming the clear error of the Brussels interpretation 
were simultaneously continuing to use the same problematic version of 
the clause in their own sovereign clients’ documents.55 To understand 
why this “patent judicial error” was uncorrected in subsequent 
contracts, two of us conducted nearly a hundred interviews with 
leading sovereign debt lawyers in New York, London, Paris, and 
Frankfurt.56 Their answers varied, but the typical response was: “Why 
should we change the clause? No court in New York or London would 
ever make such an error. This was an aberrant decision from an 
obscure court in Brussels.” Moreover, the debt lawyers argued, this was 
an ex parte decision57: If Peru’s lawyers had been given an opportunity 
to argue their position, the case would never have come down that 
way.58 
Ten years later, in December 2011, a federal district court in New 
York shattered the assumptions of the sovereign debt lawyers who had 
heaped contempt on the Brussels court. This time, the hedge fund was 
NML Capital, holding defaulted debt owed by the Republic of 
Argentina. NML requested an injunction from a federal judge in New 
York based on a claimed violation of essentially that same version of 
 
 53. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 53–119 (reporting both on data and interviews 
with lawyers). 
 54. Id. at ch. 5. 
 55. Other scholars were also puzzled by the bond lawyers’ failure to correct in their contracts 
what they were asserting was a grievous error in court interpretation. See Stephen Nelson, Market 
Rules: Social Conventions, Legal Fictions and the Organization of Sovereign Debt Markets in the 
Long Twentieth Century, in CONTRACTUAL KNOWLEDGE: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL 
EXPERIMENTATION IN GLOBAL MARKETS 118, 141–43 (Grégoire Mallard & Jérôme Sgard eds., 
2016); Leland Goss, NML v. Argentina: the Borrower, the Banker and the Lawyer: Contract 
Reform at a Snail’s Pace, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 287, 288–90 (2014); Umakanth Varottil, Sovereign 
Debt Documentation: Unraveling the Pari Passu Mystery, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 119, 122–
25 (2008). 
 56. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at chs. 6–8. 
 57. The context was a request for injunctive relief. See id. at ch. 1. 
 58. Peru’s lawyers in the case were from the firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, 
probably the leading sovereign side law firm in the world. See id. at ch. 1; see also Michael Bradley, 
Irving De Lira Salvatierra & Mitu Gulati, Lawyers: Gatekeepers of the Sovereign Debt Market?, 
38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 150, 162 (2014) (describing the market for lawyers in the sovereign 
debt context, and the key players there).  
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the pari passu clause.59 And this time the litigation was not ex parte, as 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, the law firm on the sovereign side, 
had ample opportunity to make its arguments in full. Moreover, the 
judge had handled major sovereign debt disputes before60 and had 
access to a decade’s worth of academic research studying the impact of 
the Elliott v. Peru cases.61 Nevertheless, after hearing extensive 
argument from both sides, the court held that this version of the pari 
passu clause required a pro rata payment to all creditors, including 
holdouts, in essentially the same way as had the Brussels court.62 
The financial community again expressed profound dismay at the 
court’s interpretation of the pari passu boilerplate language.63 The 
almost universal assumption of the sovereign debt community of 
lawyers, academics, and government officials was that the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—traditionally, the 
preeminent court in the country on business law matters—would 
overrule the district court and repudiate the pro rata sharing 
interpretation of pari passu. Numerous amicus briefs were filed, 
including briefs by the U.S. Department of Justice,64 the Clearing 
 
 59. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 170–75. This version of the pari passu clause is 
reproduced infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 522–23 (2d 
Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the case, see FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN 
ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISIS 64–66 (2006). 
 61. Judge Griesa’s attempts to manage the aftermath of the Argentine default and the 
various litigations is discussed in Marcus Miller & Dania Thomas, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: 
Judge Griesa, the Vultures and Creditor Rights, 30 WORLD ECON. 1491 (2007). 
 62. Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978(TPG), 09 Civ. 
1707(TPG), 09 Civ. 1708(TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011), 2011 WL 9522565, at *2. As in Brussels, 
the judge granted an injunction. This order applied to the institutions that might have otherwise 
helped Argentina pay the non-holdout creditors–they were at risk of being in contempt of court 
if they aided or abetted the debtor. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 1:08-cv-
06978, 1:08-cv-01707, 1:08-cv-01708 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012).  
 63. Some even intimated that the judge’s advancing age (he was an octogenarian) may have 
played a role in his decision. To get a flavor of some of the critiques, see, e.g., Floyd Norris, The 
Muddled Case of Argentine Bonds, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/07/25/business/rulings-add-to-the-mess-in-argentine-bonds.html [https://perma.cc/7V7B-
7YV7] and Linette Lopez, Check Out This Crazy Argentine Propaganda Poster With an American 
Judge’s Head on a Vulture’s Body, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 13, 2014, 5:35 PM), http:// 
www.businessinsider.com/argentina-judge-griesa-propaganda-poster-2014-8 [https://perma.cc/ 
VT7L-X5M6]. See also Theresa Monteleone, A Vulture’s Gamble: High-Stakes Interpretation of 
Sovereign Debt Contracts in NML Capital, Ltd v. Republic of Argentina, 8 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 149, 
160–65 (2013); Tim Samples, Rogue Trends in Sovereign Debt: Argentina, Vulture Funds, and Pari 
Passu Under New York Law, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 49, 81–85 (2014); W.M.C. Weidemaier, 
Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina, 8 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 123, 130–31 (2013). 
 64. Brief for the United States of America as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, NML 
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House Association,65 and the American Bankers Association,66 most of 
which excoriated the trial court’s interpretation of pari passu. 
Yet, in October of 2012, the Second Circuit’s three-judge panel 
unanimously affirmed the trial judge’s interpretation of Argentina’s 
pari passu clause.67 Again there were expressions of surprise and alarm 
by market insiders and more briefs filed, including by a Nobel laureate 
expert in sovereign debt, and three separate countries (adding their 
voices to that of the United States in the lower court),68 asking the U.S. 
Supreme Court to take the case and repair the damage the pro rata 
interpretation of pari passu was inflicting on the market for sovereign 
bonds. Nevertheless, in June 2014, the Supreme Court declined to hear 
the case, seeing no substantial reason to disturb the decision of the 
lower court.69 
In April 2013, as a result of the failure to get relief in the courts 
and because the market seemed unable or unwilling to fix the pari 
passu problem on its own, an effort to solve the problem began at the 
 
Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013). A leading New York law firm, 
Shearman & Sterling LLP, has usefully consolidated and organized all of the key filings in the 
NML v. Argentina case. See Argentine Sovereign Debt, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, http:// 
argentine.shearman.com [https://perma.cc/P3ZK-MAZU]. 
 65. Brief for the Clearing House Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Non-Party, NML 
Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013); Brief for the Clearing House 
Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 
727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013).  
 66. Brief for the American Bankers Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Non-Party, 
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 67. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 250–51 (2d Cir. 2012).  
 68. The amici were Anne Krueger and Joseph Stiglitz, respectively. Brief for Joseph Stiglitz 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 
2819 (2014) (mem.) (No. 13-990). The countries filing briefs at the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
opposition to the lower court’s pari passu ruling were Brazil, France, Mexico, and the United 
States. Brief for the Federative Republic of Brazil as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-990); Brief for the 
Republic of France as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Republic of Argentina’s Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-990); 
Brief for the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitions for Writs of 
Certiorari, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-990); Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Republic of Argentina v. NML 
Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014) (No. 12-842). 
 69. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S.Ct. 2819, 2819 (2014) (mem.). Not 
only did the Supreme Court decline to reinterpret pari passu, but in a related dispute over the 
scope of discovery allowed NML, the Court ruled in a fashion that facilitated NML’s efforts to 
pursue its litigation overseas. Karen Halverson Cross, U.S. Supreme Court Denies Certiorari and 
Affirms Discovery in Bondholder Litigation Against Argentina, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW: 
INSIGHTS (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/23/us-supreme-court-
denies-certiorari-and-affirms-discovery-bondholder [https://perma.cc/SBX2-GNN8]. 
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Spring IMF/World Bank Meetings.70 The primary conveners were the 
U.S. Treasury Department and the IMF, with the support of the French 
Finance Ministry’s Paris Club, the International Capital Market 
Association (ICMA), the Bank of England, and representatives from 
major ministries of finance and industry groups around the world.71 
This group of experts met again at the Fall IMF/World Bank meetings 
in October 2013.72 In December 2013, after extensive discussions with 
the foregoing committee of experts, ICMA, the leading industry group, 
issued new proposed versions of the pari passu clause in draft form.73 
The IMF, which had been actively involved in the ICMA process, 
followed a few months later with an extensive report recommending 
that sovereign issuers revise their pari passu clauses.74 Finally, in 
September 2015, after their meeting in Ankara, the G-20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors included an endorsement of 
these reform efforts on the part of the IMF in their communique.75 
As of early 2017, the IMF’s latest report on revisions to pari passu 
reveals that a majority of pure sovereign issuers have now clarified or 
modified outright their pari passu clauses.76 What the foregoing 
provides, now that widespread modifications have appeared, is the 
opportunity to unpack the mechanics of the process by which 
boilerplate terms are revised. By using a combination of the data on 
 
 70. For a description of the “back story” from a senior official at the U.S. Treasury, see Mark 
Sobel, Strengthening Collective Action Clauses: Catalyzing Change–The Back Story, 11 CAP. 
MKTS. L.J. 3, 6–9 (2016).  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. For additional detail on the reform efforts, see Goss, supra note 55, at 287–97 and 
Anna Gelpern, Brad Setser & Ben Heller, Count the Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation 
Clauses in Sovereign Bonds, in TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE: THE QUEST TO RESOLVE SOVEREIGN 
DEBT CRISES 109 (Martin Guzman, Jose Ocampo & Joseph Stiglitz eds. 2016).  
 73. Goss, supra note 55, at 289. The final version of the proposed ICMA clauses was issued 
roughly six months later in June 2014. 
 74. For a description of the IMF’s actions, see Nikita Agarwal & Chanda De Long, 
Strengthening the Contractual Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 11 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 
25, 26–27 (2016). See also Elaine Moore, IMF Recommends Overhaul of Sovereign Bonds, FIN. 
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/368be778-4d41-11e4-8f75-00144feab7de 
[https://perma.cc/U2YY-EW7P] (detailing reforms proposed by the IMF).  
 75. See generally G20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS, 
COMMUNIQUÉ FOR THE G20 SUMMIT IN ANKARA, TURKEY 6 (2015), http:// 
www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/150905-finance.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QBJ-UJB8] (“We call on the 
IMF, in consultation with other relevant parties, to continue to promote and monitor the progress 
on the implementation of the strengthened collective action and pari passu clauses . . . .”).  
 76. According to the Report, over 60 percent of new issues under both English and New 
York law have amended their pari passu clauses in the post-October 2014 period. See Agarwal & 
De Long, supra note 74, at 26. 
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the changing language of pari passu and interviews with market 
participants involved in the revision process, one can begin to answer 
the questions how and when contractual black holes, infected both with 
rote usage and encrustation, are remedied by revisions to contract 
language. In the ten years between the Brussels decision in September 
2000 and the New York decision in December 2011, virtually no 
sovereign issuer amended its pari passu clause to explicitly foreclose 
the interpretation in Elliott v. Peru.77 But as of the IMF’s report from 
mid-2015, the data show an extensive movement—albeit among only 
one distinctive subset of sovereign issuers—to reject explicitly the 
ratable payment interpretation advanced by the Brussels and New 
York courts.78 In the following Part, we examine the dynamics—and 
associated costs—of the revision process. 
Understanding those dynamics is critical to answering the initial 
question: How accurate is the assumption that sophisticated 
commercial actors will overcome inertia costs and reject a judicial 
interpretation of a black hole in a standard form boilerplate contract 
that regulates a major industry? The empirical study described below 
suggests that the standard assumption is false, at least in the context of 
one specific multi-trillion-dollar market. Changing a boilerplate term 
whose meaning has largely been forgotten and that has developed 
numerous encrustations can take years, and the process can prove 
enormously costly, particularly in terms of the hundreds of billions of 
dollars’ worth of bonds issued with suboptimal terms in the interim 
period.79 Those costs support the claim advanced in Part IV that a 
 
 77. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 26. 
 78. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE INCLUSION OF ENHANCED 
CONTRACTUAL PROTECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGN BOND CONTRACTS 8 (2015), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/091715.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS4W-XFTC]. For an 
illustration of the reduction in sovereigns employing pari passu clauses that ranked payments 
equally, see infra fig.5. 
 79. The overwhelming sentiment (as publicly articulated in the press, and what we have 
heard in interviews for this project) is that the interpretation of pari passu by the courts in Brussels 
and New York reduced the efficiency of the sovereign bond market. Nevertheless, there is the 
counterargument that observed variations in pari passu are a rational precommitment by debtors 
with different risk profiles to either foreclose or invite the possibility of a future restructuring 
attempt. See, e.g., Kahan & Leshem, supra note 40, at 15–17; Wright, supra note 40, 112–14. In a 
companion empirical paper, we test the “Rational Design” hypothesis and find it wanting. See 
Choi et al., supra note 15, at 32–33. That evidence is also consistent with the view of this case in 
the financial press: 
  So the people who thought the holdouts’ pari passu theory was crazy seem to be 
right. The world seems to be unambiguously worse off than it would be if the U.S. 
courts had rejected the theory. Argentina is worse off (it’s in a default crisis), the 
exchange bondholders are worse off (their interest payments have stopped), and the 
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search for party intent is both futile and counterproductive when 
boilerplate with these characteristics is included in industry contracts. 
III.  THE POST-LITIGATION DATA 
A. Data Sources and Coding 
To unpack the boilerplate revision process, we assembled a 
dataset of all of the available sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds for 
the five-year period between June 1, 2011 and May 30, 2016. As 
sources, we used Thomson One Banker and Perfect Information, the 
two primary public data sources of offering circulars and prospectuses 
for debt offerings. For data on prices and maturities, we supplemented 
the foregoing with information from DCM Analytics. The datasets 
provide documentation on what the industry designates as “managed 
deals,” where bankers and lawyers are involved in preparing the 
contract documentation, setting the initial prices, and finding the initial 
customers. The strongest AAA issuers, the United States, United 
Kingdom, Netherlands, Japan, Germany and France, are not included: 
owing to their strong credit, they do not use traditional contracts with 
pari passu clauses to sell their bonds.80 
The foregoing cut of the available sovereign bond data produced 
a set of 1583 bonds from 90 different issuers. The bond issuances were 
governed either under local law or a dozen different governing foreign 
law regimes. For each of these bonds, we coded two basic bond 
characteristics.81 These were (1) the type of issuer divided into two sub 
 
holdout bondholders are no better off, since it’s not like they’re getting paid anything 
either.  
  More generally, it’s crazy because it makes sovereign debt restructuring impossible. 
If you know your choice is to take 30 cents on the dollar or to take zero, you’ll probably 
take 30. But if you know that if everyone else takes 30, you can still sue for full 
repayment, then you’ll have no incentive to negotiate. The courts’ reading of the pari 
passu clause means that those holdout bonds can never be compromised; every single 
holder of those bonds can demand full payment. This is a problem that Argentina 
currently faces: Even if the holdout bondholders who sued Argentina do want to reach 
a settlement for less than 100 cents on the dollar, they have no way of binding other 
holdout bondholders.  
Matt Levine, How Should Future Argentinas Treat Future Vultures?, BLOOMBERG: VIEW (Aug. 
29, 2014, 5:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-08-29/how-should-future-
argentinas-treat-future-vultures [https://perma.cc/3RTM-9L3G]. 
 80. Also outside the dataset are bonds that might be issued in some non-AAA countries to 
purely domestic investors, usually, captive domestic banks, in which bankers, lawyers, and 
contracts are not involved. 
 81. In a companion paper, with an econometric analysis, we code for additional variables 
such as the bond ratings and offering amounts. See Choi et al., supra note 15, at 25.  
CHOI GULATI  SCOTT IN PRINTER FINAL_KK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/2017  2:10 PM 
2017] THE BLACK HOLE PROBLEM 25 
categories—pure sovereign bonds issued by nations, and quasi-
sovereign issuances, such as sovereign guarantees, sub-sovereign bonds 
of cities, states and provinces and supranationals,82 all of whom have a 
degree of sovereign immunity and, most importantly, are either not 
subject to a bankruptcy regime or where the applicability of 
bankruptcy is unclear;83 and (2) the governing law variable as either 
local law—the sovereign’s contracts are governed by its own law—or 
some foreign law that the sovereign cannot change at its discretion, 
typically English or New York law. 
We turn next to focus on the primary questions of whether and 
how the pari passu clauses changed in the wake of the NML v. 
Argentina decisions by the New York courts during the 2011–2013 
period. Here, changes to the pari passu provisions were coded in terms 
of two different types observed in the data (a) major changes to the 
core language of the pari passu clause and (b) minor changes at the 
margins that might, for example, expand or contract the scope of the 
clause’s applicability or augment the available evidence on the 
meaning of the term. 
B. Major Changes to the Core Language of Pari Passu 
First, we considered whether the clause changed in the direction 
of either the pro or antiratable payments interpretation. Our 
hypothesis was that the market would either delete the pari passu 
clause or revise it to reduce the risk of another court adopting the 
ratable payments interpretation. The baseline for each bond was the 
version of the clause that the relevant issuer was using before June 
2011. From that baseline, we examined whether and what changes were 
made to the boilerplate language subsequently. 
The typical and oldest version of the pari passu clause, a clause 
found in almost every sovereign or quasi-sovereign bond contract, 
states in essence: 
The notes rank and will rank without any preference among 
themselves and pari passu with all other unsubordinated public 
external indebtedness of the Republic. 
 
 82. Supranationals include entities such as the Asian and African Development Banks. 
 83. This latter aspect is important because the supposedly damaging impact of the ratable 
payments interpretation is most relevant in the context where there is no bankruptcy court to 
oversee a restructuring and, if necessary, force a resolution. We only coded these bonds if they 
used pari passu clauses in the period prior to December 2011 (because our interest is whether and 
how the clauses changed in these bonds in response to the case). 
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We refer to this version of the clause as the “Rank” clause. Prior 
to the pari passu litigation, eminent practitioners in the field were 
openly puzzled as to why this boilerplate clause was used in a sovereign 
debt instrument.84 The concept of Rank has a clear meaning in a 
domestic bankruptcy context, where a judge supervises the division of 
the debtor’s limited assets among creditors of different rank.85 All 
those creditors who are of equal or pari passu rank share equally once 
the creditors senior to them have been paid. But sovereigns do not and 
cannot enter a judge-supervised bankruptcy procedure. There is no 
procedure by which an insolvent sovereign’s assets—primarily, its 
ability to impose taxes on its citizens—get divided. The clause, these 
expert sovereign debt lawyers were saying, was meaningless 
boilerplate, a holdover from a distant era when its inclusion in these 
sovereign instruments might have made more sense.86 From the 
viewpoint of the contemporary market participants, the pari passu 
clause in sovereign debt instruments was precisely the kind of 
contractual black hole that had lost meaning over the years as a result 
of encrustation and rote usage. 
Over the roughly 200 years that the clause appeared in debt 
instruments—steadily increasing in popularity, even as contemporary 
understanding diminished—encrustations began to emerge as words 
and phrases were added and subtracted. These variations produced 
several distinct linguistic departures from the original “Rank” version 
of the pari passu clause. For example, in 2010, immediately prior to the 
sample period, Italy adopted a sui generis pari passu clause in its New 
York law bonds providing that: 
[t]he Securities are the . . . unsecured obligations of Italy and will rank 
equally with all other . . . unsecured and unsubordinated general 
obligations of Italy for money borrowed . . . . Amounts payable in 
respect of principal of (and interest on) the Securities will be charged 
upon and be payable out of the [Treasury of Italy], equally and ratably 
with all other amounts so charged and amounts payable in respect of 
 
 84. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at ch. 4. 
 85. See Mitu Gulati & Kenneth Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635, 639–40 & 639 n.26 
(2001). 
 86. In prior work, we suggested a story for why the clause might have made sense in the era 
of gunboat diplomacy in the 1800s. With the gunboats, after all, the foreign creditors could take 
over the debtor’s ports, where the tax revenues were collected, and, in effect, liquidate the assets. 
But almost no one among the parties to the current transactions seemed aware of that earlier 
interpretation nor, more importantly, seemed to care. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at chs. 8–
9. 
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all other general loan obligations of Italy. 
We term this version of the clause, that provides for explicit 
ratable payments, the “Pay Equally and Ratably” pari passu clause. 
The Pay Equally and Ratably clause poses a high risk of holdouts as it 
appears to promise that all creditors be paid ratably whether or not 
they have consented to a restructuring. 
Sometime in the 1980s, other bonds began to promise investors yet 
a third version: 
The bonds rank, and will rank, pari passu in right of payment with all 
of the Issuer’s present and future unsubordinated External 
Indebtedness.87 
We term this version the “Rank Equally in Payment” pari passu 
clause. This was the version of the clause Singer’s hedge fund seized 
upon, first in Brussels and later in New York. Singer’s fund found a 
New York University law professor who opined that he understood the 
meaning of the clause. A sovereign debtor who was in arrears to 
creditors, Professor Andreas Lowenfeld explained, had to pay the 
creditors who ranked pari passu in right of payment on a pro rata 
basis.88 And importantly, given that a court’s order to pay is largely 
meaningless against a sovereign debtor, Lowenfeld explained that the 
clause was an intercreditor agreement that entitled a creditor who was 
not paid his pro rata share to an injunction against other creditors who 
were paid that share.89 In the context of a debt restructuring, where 
some creditors have agreed to take a haircut on their bonds and others 
are holding out and not receiving any payment, an injunction against 
another creditor is a powerful remedy for the holdouts. That was 
precisely what the creditors in Brussels and in New York asked for and 
obtained. 
For coding purposes, it is important to recognize that the version 
of the pari passu clause at issue in both the Argentine and Peruvian 
litigations was particularly vulnerable to Lowenfeld’s pro rata or 
ratable payment interpretation: the word “payment” was used to 
modify the promise on the part of the issuer that the bonds would “rank 
 
 87. See Lee C. Buchheit & Sofia D. Martos, What To Do About Pari Passu?, 8 
BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 491, 491 (2014) (emphasis added) (emphasis 
omitted). The evolution of the different formulations of the clause is described in Mark 
Weidemaier, Robert E. Scott & Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 
38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 72 (2013). 
 88. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 50, at 878 (describing Lowenfeld’s argument). 
 89. Id. 
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equally.” The clauses at issue in both litigations went beyond the 
standard “rank equally” language to include the promise that “the 
bonds rank, and will rank, pari passu in right of payment.” 
We rated the vulnerability of the different clauses based on the 
risk of successful litigation by holdout creditors on a scale of high risk 
to zero risk, with high risk being maximal vulnerability (where the 
contract language said explicitly that each creditor was entitled to 
equal ratable payments); to medium risk (the type of clause that used 
the word “payment” to modify “rank”); to low risk (which only 
articulated the concept of ranking).90 
Finally, we coded a category of bonds in a subset of clauses 
primarily governed by English law as having a near zero risk. In these 
bonds, the standard pari passu language gets supplemented by words 
such as “except as subject to provisions of mandatory law.”91 On its 
face, this additional language appears to say that the effect of the basic 
clause can be negated by the passage of a local law. In other words, the 
debtor has the power to render the clause meaningless as a creditor 
weapon. We term this version of the pari passu clause the “Mandatory 
Law” variation. Table I summarizes the different types of pari passu 
clauses found in the data set in 2011 and the risk of holdouts from a 
debt restructuring that each posed prior to the Southern District of 





 90. In our empirical tests of pricing effects for a companion article, we code these on a scale 
of 10, 5, 1, and 0, which roughly corresponds to the relative risk levels.  
 91. See Weidemaier et al., supra note 87, at 88 fig.2 and accompanying text (illustrating the 
increase in similar “mandatory law” phrases in English-law bonds). This provision has come to 
light in the context of Ukraine’s recently concluded restructuring exercise. See Joseph Cotterill, 
Ukraine’s Bonds: A Little Local Leverage?, FIN. TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (Mar. 26, 2015), 
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/03/26/2122586/ukraines-bonds-a-little-local-leverage 
[https://perma.cc/AT32-P9HS] (providing examples of different sovereigns including similar 
provisions in their bonds). 
 92. For discussions of the evolution of these different clauses and their risk levels, see 
Buchheit & Martos, supra note 87, at 491–93 and Weidemaier et al., supra note 87, at 84–90 figs.1, 
2 & 3. We had also envisioned coding some bonds as zero risk, where the pari passu clause had 
been deleted altogether, but no such observations appear in the data. 
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Table I: Types of Pari Passu Clause 
 
 Pari Passu Clause   Risk Level 
Pay Equally and Ratably High 
Rank Equally in Payment Medium 
Rank Low 
Mandatory Law Zero 
 
C. Minor Revisions: Modifications That Might Influence 
Interpretation or Scope 
Initially, we assumed that if parties disagreed with a court’s 
interpretation of a boilerplate clause in a standard form contract, even 
accounting for ordinary friction costs, they ultimately would adopt 
what we have called a “major change”: either delete the term or revise 
its core language to reject the now-disfavored meaning. Instead, we 
found in the data a number of unanticipated minor changes. 
1. The Evidentiary Patch.  The most common minor modification 
reflected in the data was the introduction of an evidentiary patch—a 
supplementary sentence in the offering prospectus explaining what the 
clause did not mean.93 As a matter of contract doctrine, such a 
modification made outside the core language of the relevant contract 
provision is less effective than a major change to the contract language 
itself.94 A court will focus first on the language of the clause in the 
 
 93. See, e.g., REPUBLIC OF HOND., OFFERING CIRCULAR, 7.50% NOTES DUE 2024, at 8 
(2013), http://www.sefin.gob.hn/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ofering_circular.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/EER8-4356] (“To ensure clarity on the point, Honduras intends to take the position that the 
pari passu clause in the terms and conditions of the Notes does not obligate it to pay Public 
External Indebtedness on a ratable basis.”). 
 94. For a classic case where arguments bearing on how a bond contract provision should be 
interpreted were made on the basis of risk disclosures in the prospectus and other public 
statements by company officials, see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 
1514–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“In interpreting these contracts, this Court must be concerned with 
what the parties intended, but only to the extent that what they intended is evidenced by what is 
written in the indentures.” (emphasis added)). 
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contract: even if there is elsewhere in the offering documents a 
disavowal of one particular meaning, the risk of misinterpretation 
remains. In an analogous evidentiary patch, some bonds in the 
database include a further supplementary explanation regarding risk, 
referred to as a “risk factor” disclosure. Here, issuers report in the risk 
disclosure section of the offering prospectus that the pari passu clause 
in the contract poses a risk of an adverse interpretation for investors.95 
These evidentiary patches and risk factor disclosures may not 
measurably effect the interpretation of boilerplate terms when there is 
a large body of available evidence on the term’s meaning. Issuers, 
however, may believe that these additions will have more influence on 
a court’s interpretation of a contractual black hole where there is an 
evidentiary vacuum. 
2. Scope of the Clause.  Our final coding concerns the scope of the 
clause. Pari passu clauses vary in terms of the breadth of the promise 
they make. Most pari passu provisions in international bonds promise 
the bonds will rank pari passu with some portion of the sovereign’s 
other unsecured and unsubordinated obligations.96 The size of that 
portion ranges from the sovereign’s “external indebtedness,” which is 
usually defined as the indebtedness of the sovereign that is 
denominated in a foreign currency to “all unsecured and 
unsubordinated obligations,” which is sufficiently broad to include the 
 
 95. The operative language from Paraguay’s Offering Circular from January 2013 says: 
  In ongoing litigation in federal courts in New York captioned NML Capital, Ltd. v. 
Republic of Argentina, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled that 
the ranking clause in bonds issued by Argentina prevents Argentina from making 
payments in respect of the bonds unless it makes pro rata payments in respect of 
defaulted debt that ranks pari passu with the performing bonds. The judgment has been 
appealed.  
  We cannot predict when or in what form a final appellate decision will be granted. 
Depending on the scope of the final decision, a final decision that requires ratable 
payments could potentially hinder or impede future sovereign debt restructurings and 
distressed debt management . . . . Paraguay cannot predict whether or in what manner 
the courts will resolve this dispute or how any such judgment will be applied or 
implemented. 
REPUBLIC OF PARA., OFFERING CIRCULAR, 4.625% BONDS DUE 2023, at 17 (2013), 
https://ftalphaville-cdn.ft.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Paraguay-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3GQM-LZ2A]. 
 96. For a description of these variations, see Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring After NML v Argentina, 12 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 224, 238 app. (2017) and Rodrigo 
Olivares-Caminal, The Definition of Indebtedness and the Consequent Imperiling of the Pari 
Passu, Negative Pledge and Cross-Default Clauses in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 12 CAP. MKTS. 
L.J. 164, 169–78 (2017). 
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salaries owed by the sovereign to its domestic employees.97 As long as 
the clause was seen by the contracting parties as a meaningless artifact, 
the breadth of the clause did not matter to the parties. However, under 
the court’s injunction in NML v. Argentina, the scope of the clause 
became of paramount importance. The breadth of the court’s 
injunction halting payments to other creditors was directly dependent 
on whether the holdout creditors had been promised pari passu 
treatment with respect to that particular set of creditors.98 If not, then 
there was no right to an injunction against those creditors.99 
Our purpose in coding for scope was to see whether, once the New 
York ratable payments interpretation was issued, parties became 
concerned about the reach of their pari passu clauses. Assuming that 
there was disagreement with the court’s interpretation, parties should 
revise their contracts by narrowing the scope of pari passu in the post 
NML v. Argentina clauses. We coded for whether the clause was 
framed in terms of external indebtedness (the narrowest version); all 
indebtedness (the intermediate category); or all obligations (the 
broadest version).100 
D. The Empirical Results of the Post-Litigation Study 
1. All Issuers.  We hypothesized that the parties to sovereign bond 
contracts—realizing that a clause whose purpose they did not 
understand was adding unnecessary risk—would either delete the 
clause or amend its core language to reject the courts’ ratable payments 
interpretation explicitly.101 This hypothesis seemed even more 
plausible after the widely condemned ratable payments interpretation 
was endorsed by the most important commercial courts in the United 
States.102 Parties that disagree with the interpretation should either 
delete the clause or clarify its meaning. 
Indeed, commentary at the time of the SDNY interpretation 
proposed deletion as a response. Buchheit and Martos, from the 
leading sovereign debt firm of Cleary Gottlieb, wrote in the wake of 
the NML v. Argentina decision: 
 
 97. See Olivares-Caminal, supra note 96 at 170–72. 
 98. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 96, at 225–28.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 231–32, 238 app. (describing the versions). 
 101. Leading lawyers in the field also shared this assumption. See, e.g., Buchheit & Martos, 
supra note 87, at 491–92; Goss, supra note 55, at 288–90.  
 102. See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. 
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The clause serves no useful function in countries whose laws do not 
permit the involuntary subordination of an existing creditor, which is 
why it does not appear in the standard documentation for domestic 
debt issuances in most countries. So jettisoning the clause altogether 
will not adversely affect the position of creditors and will avoid the risk 
of further aberrant judicial interpretations down the road.103 
The image accompanying the cover-page article in the New York 
Law Journal by a lawyer from Arnold & Porter, another leading law 





























 103. Buchheit & Martos, supra note 87, at 492 (emphasis added). 
 104. Berry, supra note 50, at 1. 
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Despite this commentary from prominent sovereign debt lawyers, 
there is no evidence in the dataset that parties deleted the pari passu 
clause after the SDNY opinion. Indeed, not a single issuer deleted the 
pari passu clause in response to any of the court decisions or to the IMF 
report condemning them. Moreover, not a single bond added language 
to articulate clearly the rights of creditors or the obligations of 
sovereign debtors under the clause. 
The data does show major and minor changes to the clause of the 
types mentioned above—revisions that appear designed to reduce the 
risk of future courts adopting the ratable payments interpretation.105 
We examine the pattern of adoption of these major and minor 
modifications in the June 2011 to May 2016 period. There was no real 
movement to change any of the language of the core portion of the 
clause in any direction for almost three years after the federal district 
court’s first ratable payments interpretation in December 2011. In late 
2014, however, revisions began to move dramatically toward the low 
risk, Rank version of pari passu by removing the word “payment” from 
the boilerplate term. This convergence on a single type of pari passu 
clause served to eliminate the language that supported the ratable 
payments interpretation in the New York and Brussels cases.106 
We first report the percentage of issuances for all issuers in the 
dataset that contain at least one change, whether major or minor, to 
the pari passu clause. To determine a change, we use the pari passu 
clause in a sovereign’s last offering prior to the start of the dataset in 
2011 but after 2005 as the point of comparison (the “initial pari passu 
clause”). Figure 1 reports for all issuers in the dataset. The data is 
reported on a quarterly basis starting from the second quarter of 2011 
to the second quarter of 2016. For each quarter we report the 
percentage of bonds issued containing changes to the clause relative to 
the initial pari passu clause. The vertical lines in Figure 1 are the points 
at which key events occurred such as the SDNY decision (December 
2011), the two appellate court decisions (October 2012 and August 
 
 105. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE INCLUSION OF ENHANCED 
CONTRACTUAL PROTECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGN BOND CONTRACTS 2 (2015), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/091715.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3E5-R9F6].  
 106. For our analysis, we start with 1,583 issuances between June 1, 2011 to May 30, 2016, and 
examine whether the pari passu clause for a sovereign or quasi-sovereign’s issuances on a 
particular day is different from the issuer’s last issuance prior to the start of the dataset on June 
1, 2011. For our analysis, we collapsed multiple issuances on the same day into one observation—
leaving us with 1281 unique issuer-issue date observations—and treated a change as occurring if 
a particular change occurred for any of the issuances on that day relative to the last issuance prior 
to June 1, 2011.  
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2013), and the Supreme Court denial of certiorari (June 2014). 
The 2011 SDNY decision produced no immediate reaction in the 
data. For an entire year after that decision, only a small fraction of 
sovereign or quasi-sovereign issuers made any major or minor changes 
to their pari passu clauses. The inactivity in the market is even more 
vivid if one considers the dollar amount of bond debt that was issued 
during this period with unmodified versions of the clause. Figure 2 
depicts the aggregate dollar amount of issuances by quarter for the 
bonds in the dataset, categorized by those with and without a change 
in the pari passu clause, where change is measured relative to a 
sovereign’s initial pari passu clause. Figure 2 excludes those issuers that 
had a low risk Rank clause as their initial pari passu clause—the 
eventual market standard as we will see below. Excluding the Rank 
version allows us to determine the dollar amount of bonds using an 
unmodified clause that does not represent what the market eventually 
views as the standard and is thus presumably optimal. As Figure 2 
shows, over $1.5 trillion worth of sovereign and quasi-sovereign bond 
debt was issued with such unmodified clauses during 2012 alone. 
One might wonder here whether the market thought that the 
SDNY decision was an outlier that was certain to be overturned and 
therefore did not need to be taken seriously. Yet, in October 2012, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. 
Though some changes in the pari passu clause then began to occur, the 
large majority of issuances in both numbers and aggregate dollar 
amount remained unchanged. During 2013, another $1.4 trillion of 
bonds were issued, again without any revision to pari passu. A handful 
of issuers did revise the contract language in 2013, but the 
overwhelming majority of bonds were issued without any attempt to 
modify or clarify their pari passu clauses.107 The first nine months of 
2014 continued in the same fashion with another $0.9 trillion in bonds 
issued without revisions in the issuers’ clauses, despite a June 2014 U.S. 
Supreme Court’s denial of appeal from the Second Circuit.108 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate a simple point: If we assume that 
continuing to use a clause presenting a significant risk of an 
interpretation error imposes costs on the parties to the contract, then 
 
 107. As an aside, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its decision in August 2013, NML Capital, 
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 245–48 (2d Cir. 2013), but that action does not seem 
to have had much of an effect. 
 108. The Supreme Court’s refusal to review the interpretation issue was likely anticipated by 
the market in any event since the Supreme Court almost never takes contract interpretation cases 
in the current era.  
CHOI GULATI  SCOTT IN PRINTER FINAL_KK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/2017  2:10 PM 
2017] THE BLACK HOLE PROBLEM 35 
it follows that substantial social costs were incurred because of an 
apparently high level of inertia impeding change during this period. 
Between June 1, 2011 and May 30, 2016, roughly $5.4 trillion worth of 
sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds were issued with terms that were 
likely suboptimal.109 To be sure, the precise costs (in terms of the 
additional risk of holdouts caused by using the risky term) vary across 
bond issues depending on the likelihood of default and the precise 
wording of the clause in question. But it seems plausible to conclude 
that substantial costs were incurred because the market was so slow in 
adjusting to the decisions of the New York courts.110 
While change in the pari passu clause came only slowly after June 
1, 2011, the pace of change increased after October 1, 2014. In Figure 
1, note that the percentage of issuances with pari passu revisions for 
those issuers not initially with the Rank version of the clause increases 
more than 100 percent, from 9 percent in the third quarter of 2014 to 
19 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014. In Figure 2, note that bond 
offerings with a revised term by issuers not initially with the Rank 
version accounted for 19 percent of the aggregate dollar amount of all 
offerings in the third quarter of 2014 and then increased to 60 percent 
of the aggregate dollar amount of all offerings in the fourth quarter of 
2014. By the second quarter of 2016, bond offerings with a revised 
contract clause or evidentiary patch accounted for 67 percent of the 
aggregate dollar amount of all offerings. Moreover, all the major and 
minor changes during this period were attempts to constrain or 
repudiate the effects of the NML v. Argentina decision. 
In sum, we see evidence of an extended period of inertia followed 
by increasing volume of changes to the pari passu clause, particularly 
after October 1, 2014. Our conjecture from observing this phenomenon 
 
 109. See Lucy McNulty, The Future for Pari Passu, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 2013, at 19, 19 
(reporting from a survey of market actors in the sovereign debt industry that there was 
widespread agreement as to the need for contract reform, yet tremendous inertia as a result of 
the difficulties in coordinating a move to a new standard). 
 110. Although imprecise, a measure of the costs of an erroneous pari passu decision are 
provided by the costs Argentina had to bear as a result of the decade-long litigation in New York. 
Among the direct indications of these costs are the facts that Argentina was denied access to the 
foreign capital markets for over a decade and the amounts it was eventually willing to pay holdout 
creditors to be able to gain access in 2016. For a detailed discussion, see generally Martin Guzman, 
An Analysis of Argentina’s 2001 Default Resolution (CIGI Working Paper No. 110, 2016). 
Another illustration of the costs embedded in the use of a “risky” clause is the looming problem 
in Venezuelan bonds that are on the verge of default. See Robin Wigglesworth, Small Print on 
Venezuelan Debt Will Pique Wall Street’s Interest, FIN. TIMES (June 17, 2016), https:// 
www.ft.com/content/36ed3e64-324c-11e6-bda0-04585c31b153 [https://perma.cc/9S2S-P6RY]. 
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is that once clauses such as pari passu are encrusted with legal jargon 
and repeated by rote over many years, they are impervious to 
amendment for a considerable period.111 The eventual shift in the 
market to adopt changes repudiating the ratable payment 
interpretation to the pari passu clause allows us to rule out a plausible 
competing hypothesis—that market participants in fact agreed with the 
SDNY opinion and were thus content with their existing pari passu 
terms. 
To determine what caused the extended delay in effecting the 
revisions to pari passu, we delve into the dynamics of the changes once 
they began to occur. Of the bond issues in the dataset that reveal a 
change in the pari passu clause relative to their last issuance before 
June 1, 2011, 93.6 percent involve bonds issued directly by the 
sovereign, or what we refer to as “pure sovereign” issuances.112 
Accordingly, we next focus on the dynamics of pari passu changes for 
the Pure Sovereign issuers. 
2. Pure Sovereign Issuers.  We start with an examination of major 
changes in pari passu language for the pure sovereign issuers: these 
major revisions involve the greatest reduction in the risk of holdouts 
that variations in the pari passu clauses pose. We posit that sovereigns 
face the greatest inertia costs in undertaking a major modification of 
the pari passu clause. We focus especially on pure sovereign issuers 
that are governed by foreign law, as sovereigns that issue under their 
own local law will have other means to protect themselves against 
holdouts besides modifying the pari passu clause.113 We therefore 
 
 111. Our hypothesis that black hole clauses are subject to extraordinary inertia costs finds 
support in the reaction of the market to the Brussels decision in 2000. Rather than revise the pari 
passu clause to eliminate the risk of a ratable payments interpretation, the market chose instead 
to coordinate on revising the no-modification, or unanimous action, clauses in New York bonds 
that required unanimous approval of all creditors to change contract terms prior to a 
restructuring. Coordinating an agreement on revisions that lowered the vote to modify to 75 
percent—thus increasing the burden on holdouts to obtain a blocking position—was 
accomplished in a little over two years, from late 2001 to mid-2003. This revision ameliorated but 
did not solve the holdout problem: it was preferred, we surmise, because, unlike pari passu, the 
no-modification clauses were well understood and familiar to the market. For discussion of this 
shift in contract language, see generally Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private 
Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627 (2006).  
 112. As contrasted to “quasi-sovereign” issues, which are issuances by cities, states, regions 
within the sovereign state or issuances by some public or private corporate entity backed by a 
sovereign guarantee. 
 113. The restructuring of Greek local-law governed bonds engineered via domestic legislation 
in March 2012 is an example of the vulnerability of local-law bonds, as compared to foreign ones. 
See generally Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt 
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expect that changes in the pari passu clause itself will occur primarily 
for those pure sovereigns that issue bonds under foreign law, typically 
English or New York law. Restricting our analysis to pure sovereign 
issuances under foreign law left us with 791 issuances from June 1, 2011 
to May 30, 2016.114 
In Figure 3, we report the percentage of bond issues by pure 
sovereign issuers under foreign law by quarter that involve a major 
revision in the pari passu clause relative to the sovereign’s initial pari 
passu clause. Note the dramatic increase in major revisions to the pari 
passu clause after October 1, 2014. The percentage of revised clauses 
issued by pure sovereigns under foreign law increases from 9 percent 
in the third quarter of 2014 to 40 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014. 
We use both quantitative and qualitative data to explain below why 
October 2014 was so important. 
Prior to October 2014, very few bonds issued by pure sovereigns 
under foreign law included a major change to the pari passu clause.115 
A different story emerges when we examine the minor modifications 
made in response to the court cases in NML v. Argentina. As described 
earlier, none of these minor modifications would have fully corrected 
for the courts’ interpretation. Yet, minor modifications do appear and 
potentially with some significance. To provide an example, Brazil 
reported to investors in the risk disclosure section of its July 2014 
prospectus supplement, the following: 
Recent federal court decisions in New York create uncertainty 
regarding the meaning of ranking provisions and could potentially 
reduce or hinder the ability of sovereign issuers, including Brazil, to 
 
Restructuring: An Autopsy, 28 ECON. POL’Y 513 (2013) (contrasting the treatment of the bonds 
governed under different laws). 
 114. We examine whether the pari passu clause for a sovereign’s issuances on a particular day 
differs from the sovereign’s last issuance prior to the start of the dataset on June 1, 2011. For our 
analysis, we collapsed multiple issuances on the same day into one observation—leaving us with 
545 unique issuer-issue date observations for pure sovereigns under foreign law—and treated an 
amendment as occurring if a particular modification occurred for any of the issuances on that day 
relative to the last issuance prior to June 1, 2011.  
 115. The first bond to disavow explicitly the ratable payments interpretation was an issuance 
by Belize in June 2013, roughly eighteen months after the NML v. Argentina decision in the trial 
court. See Buchheit & Martos, supra note 87, at 493. Belize was a first mover partly because it had 
just gone through a restructuring, the first restructuring after the NML v. Argentina decision. See 
Robin Wigglesworth, Belize Does “Superbond” Deal with Lenders, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013), 
https://www.ft.com/content/2817d01c-75d4-11e2-b702-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/9DA6-
3MK8]. 
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restructure their debt.116 
It is perhaps an overstatement to suggest that this statement even 
qualifies as a minor modification of pari passu. The disclosure here 
does little more than inform the investor that there is a new risk that 
remains in the documentation: at best, the statement conveys an 
undertone of disapproval of the NML v. Argentina decision to a 
future court.117 
Figure 4 reports minor modifications relative to a sovereign’s 
initial pari passu clause as a percentage of all pure sovereign issuances 
under foreign law for each quarter of the dataset. Figure 3 showed that 
there were no major shifts through 2012, and little response in 2013. 
When we look at minor shifts in Figure 4, the data show some changes 
in 2012 and increasing changes in 2013 and 2014. Market participants 
appeared much more willing to experiment with minor shifts prior to 
October 2014, as compared with major shifts. This is consistent with 
higher inertia costs affecting efforts to modify directly the risk level of 
a pari passu clause as opposed to modifications designed to provide 
evidence on the meaning of the pari passu clause, given the evidentiary 
vacuum of meaning for a black hole term. Notwithstanding the 
evidentiary patches and other minor changes in the offering 
prospectuses prior to October 2014, the overall pattern shown in Figure 
3, for major shifts, remains the same for minor shifts as shown in Figure 
4. After October 2014, there is a marked increase in the minor 
modifications to the pari passu clause. All of the changes in Figure 4 
are in the direction of constraining the effects of the NML v. Argentina 
decision by limiting the risk of the pari passu clause. 
3. The October Meetings.  The timing of the cluster of changes, and 
the sudden increase in the rate of change in October 2014 correlates 
with a set of meetings at which a number of the key players in sovereign 
debt law gathered. The first of those gatherings was held at Columbia 
Law School immediately prior to the annual IMF/World Bank 
meetings in Washington, D.C. The second was held shortly thereafter 
at the New York Federal Reserve. Two of us hosted the Columbia Law 
 
 116. FEDERATED REPUBLIC OF BRAZ., PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT, 5% GLOBAL BONDS 
DUE 2045, at S-8 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/205317/000119312514276243/ 
d761027d424b5.htm [https://perma.cc/HFE6-WHJD].  
 117. This sense of disapproval would be amplified further if one were to look at the amicus 
brief filed by the government of Brazil asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the pari passu 
dispute and reverse the lower court. Brief for the Federal Republic of Brazil as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 68, at 3–7. 
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School meeting: at that juncture we had collected roughly three 
quarters of the dataset, which showed clearly the slow response to 
NML v. Argentina reported above. We were puzzled both by the lack 
of revision to the core language of the various pari passu clauses, 
despite the expressed dismay over the NML v. Argentina litigation, and 
by the prevalence of a strategy that relied on minor modifications to 
the risk disclosure sections of the bonds. To better understand the data, 
we invited thirty of the most knowledgeable parties from both London 
and New York to participate in a discussion of the data.118 We report 
in Part III.C the content of the conversations with these senior 
practitioners. Relevant here, however, is that many of the practitioners 
expressed dissatisfaction with the draft clauses that ICMA and the 
official sector had promulgated. Some were unhappy at not being 
consulted during the ICMA drafting process, others objected to the 
clause that had been proposed, and still others had clients who were 
uncertain whether any revisions to the ratable payments interpretation 
would advance their interests. At the conclusion of the Columbia 
meeting, we assumed that any significant movement toward wholesale 
revision of the clause was unlikely in the near term. 
Senior representatives of the IMF, the U.S. Treasury and ICMA, 
as well as senior lawyers who had been on the drafting committee for 
the proposed revised clauses, attended the meeting at Columbia. 
Dismayed by the conversation, senior statesmen in the group convened 
a second meeting a few weeks later.119 Unlike the Columbia meeting, 
this next session, hosted at the offices of the New York Federal 
Reserve, was by invitation only. The Federal Reserve meeting was 
comprised of a select group of elite lawyers, most of whom were at the 
Columbia meeting as well. Almost all of the lawyers represented the 
pure sovereign issuers, mostly emerging market sovereigns from Latin 
America issuing bonds under New York or English law. Each of the 
invitees understood that they were being asked by the public sector 
 
 118. For details on how the group was constructed, see infra note 142. 
 119. A key participant explained: 
  The Columbia meeting set the cat among the pigeons. [What we saw at the meeting] 
was a good deal of unhappiness among the NY lawyers (and some of the large Latin 
American sovereign issuers) with the drafting of the [ ] clauses. [That drafting had been 
done primarily by the English lawyers in collaboration with ICMA and had an English 
law style]. [In response to the problem] Cleary Gottlieb and Sullivan & Cromwell 
quickly drafted “New York versions” of the clauses, intended to be substantively the 
same but written in a more plain-speaking, Yankee homespun manner. FRBNY was 
chosen because of its gravitas–the participants needed to understand this was important 
[and that meeting at Columbia might have had the opposite effect].  
Email from a meeting participant to Authors (Aug. 13, 2016) (on file with authors).  
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authorities to contribute to a coordinated effort to combat the danger 
posed by NML v. Argentina’s ratable payment interpretation.120 
Sources who attended reported that the dynamics of the second 
meeting were remarkably different from the Columbia session: instead 
of the dissension at the first meeting, a consensus quickly emerged that 
everyone involved needed, and was willing to, cooperate in trying to 
solve the systemic problem caused by the rogue interpretation of the 
New York courts.121 We cannot prove causation, but the data for the 
sovereign issuers shows a remarkable change in late October 2014, 
coinciding with the two New York meetings.122 
4. The Pattern of Changes in Boilerplate: Rational Design or 
Random Mutation.  Figures 1 through 4 tell us that changes to the pari 
passu clauses were slow to occur. But they do not give many clues as to 
why, other than that something happened in October 2014 that 
increased the rate of change significantly. We draw here from a 
companion empirical article in which we conduct an econometric 
analysis of that question.123 
As described earlier, and as Figure 5 shows, we know that 
sovereign issuers were not all using the same pari passu clauses at the 
 
 120. According to one source: 
  [It was made clear to the participants] that no one wanted to open the door on 
substantive points being renegotiated. [The goal was to] spend a sufficient amount of 
time describing the collaboration/engagement/orchestration between the parties and 
the significant period of discussion on the substance that preceded it in the hope that 
we could obtain buy in. 
  [Lengthy calls were had, I believe] with [many] of the participants on the contract 
reforms and it was only after they understood the level of discussion and collaboration 
and the “settled” nature of the end product (and its advantages fully) that they came 
on board with not unpicking key elements.  
Email from a meeting participant to Authors (Aug. 13, 2016) (on file with authors). 
 121. According to a participant: 
  Sitting at that table at the Fed were lawyers representing a substantial part of the 
Latin American sovereign issuer and underwriter community. So when the U.S. 
Treasury [representative] pronounced at the meeting that a consensus seemed to have 
been reached, everyone left with the sense that they were morally committed to 
encourage their clients to use the new NY clauses. Or at least not to discourage their 
clients from using the clauses. 
Email from a meeting participant to Authors (Aug. 14, 2016) (on file with authors). 
 122. There were more conversations about this topic at the annual World Bank/IMF meeting 
during the roughly three-week period between the two meetings. In particular, there were 
multiple sessions during the IMF/World Bank meetings for debt managers around the globe at 
which experts on the pari passu litigation were asked to conduct seminars explaining the 
implications of the ratable payments interpretation and how the contracts could be reformed. 
 123. See generally Choi et al., supra note 15 (using statistical survival models to gauge which 
event spurred the adoption of new pari passu clauses). 
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outset: some were more vulnerable than others to the risk of erroneous 
interpretation posed by the NML v. Argentina litigation.124 Moreover, 
some sovereigns with very high credit ratings might be thought to 
present such a low probability of default that they were indifferent to 
the type of pari passu clause used in their contracts. One might wonder 
whether the issuers that modified their clauses earlier had the most 
vulnerable clauses and/or the lowest credit ratings. Affirmative 
answers to both those questions would suggest that the substantial 
social costs described earlier were exaggerated. Yet no such neat 
pattern appears in the data. There are some clearly identifiable subsets 
of issuers for whom changes occur earlier than others. But the pattern 
is not a clear correlation between speed of revision and strength of 
credit ratings or vulnerability to the interpretation in NML v. 
Argentina. Moreover, the initial revisions we observe do not involve 
major changes to the contract language but rather more evidentiary-
focused minor modifications. The fact of sovereigns avoiding major 
changes and attempting instead to add evidence of their understanding 
of the existing contract language is consistent with the kind of 
evidentiary vacuum that is characteristic of a black hole clause.125 
The most clearly identifiable subset of issuers who undertook 
either minor or major revisions are the pure sovereigns issuing bonds 
under either English or New York law. Almost none of the changes 
come from the quasi-sovereign issuers, such as government-guaranteed 
bonds, bonds from cities and provinces, and supranational bonds. And, 
importantly, these quasi-sovereign issuers are often the riskier debtors 
as compared to the corresponding pure sovereign issuers. In our 
empirical paper, we analyze the dynamics of change more specifically 
within the subset of pure sovereign bonds issued under New York and 
English laws. There, we run a statistical test of the predictions drawn 
from two competing models of the dynamics of change in boilerplate 
contracts.126 
The first model is the traditional conception of contracting that we 
call the “Rational Design” model.127 Here, contracting parties are 
assumed to tailor contract terms rationally and optimally to their 
 
 124. See Weidemaier et al., supra note 87, at 84 fig.1 (describing the data from 1960 to 2011 
for pure sovereign issuers). 
 125. See generally Choi et al., supra note 15 (detailing the evidentiary shifts, particularly 
during the period between December 2011 and October 2014). 
 126. Id. at 22–32. 
 127. Id. at 3–4; see also Anderson & Manns, supra note 33, at 80 (calling this the “artisanal 
model”). 
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needs. If courts appear to err in interpreting contract language, parties 
will respond promptly by revising the terms to clarify their joint intent. 
In markets using standard forms, this process of error correction may 
be slower owing to ordinary inertia costs: individual parties may, for 
example, rationally prefer the network benefits from retaining the 
original terms.128 Nevertheless, variation in the terms among parties 
doing the same type of deal ultimately will result from the different 
characteristics of the contracting parties.129 Rational Design predicts 
that parties will adjust their pari passu clauses to account for different 
perceptions of the risk of future default. For example, sovereigns who 
anticipate, or wish to signal, a low risk of default will be motivated to 
precommit not to restructure in the future by writing pari passu terms 
that increase the risk of holdouts.130 In this model, contractual black 
holes do not arise and, even if they did, they would not persist. 
In the second, “Random Mutation” model, contract language in 
standardized boilerplate is assumed to follow an essentially random 
evolutionary path.131 Standardized contracts are rarely drafted from 
scratch: they are largely copied from prior deals by agents with 
imperfect and incomplete understanding of the prior deals and the 
terms that regulate them.132 Rote usage and encrustation will occur, 
particularly with contract terms that are widely used but are not 
regularly tested or otherwise updated, and the result will be the 
periodic creation of contractual black holes. Attempting to fit the 
standard form to the particular requirements of an individual client 
produces variation that contributes to the formulation of contractual 
black holes. In this model, repairing black holes is more difficult 
because of uncertainty. Parties are ignorant of the terms’ meaning and 
of any incentive effects, and in this evidentiary vacuum, coordination 
is required to effect a revision. 
After running a series of tests pitting the two models against each 
other, there is little evidence in the data to support the Rational Design 
 
 128. The value of having a standard form that everyone understands and can price accurately 
produces positive network effects. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 34, at 731–33. 
 129. Scholars use the assumption of Rational Design to attempt to explain variation in the 
pari passu context. See generally Benjamin Chabot & Veronica Santarosa, Don’t Cry for 
Argentina (or Other Sovereign Borrowers): Lessons from a Previous Era of Sovereign Debt 
Contract Enforcement, 12 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 9 (2017) (explaining the rationality behind lending to 
sovereigns); Kahan & Leshem, supra note 40 (discussing the strategic consequences of pari passu 
clauses); Wright, supra note 40 (discussing rationality of actions). 
 130. See supra note 129. 
 131. Choi et al., supra note 15, at 4.  
 132. E.g., Anderson & Manns, supra note 33, at 80–84; Richman, supra note 33, at 81–82. 
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model.133 A case such as NML v. Argentina should motivate a revision 
of the contracts under both the Rational Design and Random Mutation 
models, but the character of the revisions should be dramatically 
different in each case. The clearest differential prediction from the two 
models is that revisions should result in the same amount of variation 
across issuers as prior to the court decision shock if the Rational Design 
story is true—after all, variation is optimal, rational and desired. In 
contrast, the revisions postshock should result in a reduction in 
variation under the Random Mutation model, according to which 
variation is essentially random, unintended and creates unnecessary 
risk. Figure 5 provides a graphical depiction of the frequency of 
different sovereign offerings by type of pari passu clause. After the 
October 2014 meetings that led to collectivizing consensus in the 
marketplace, we see a dramatic reduction from 2015 to 2016 in the 
variation in the types of clauses in response to NML v. Argentina.134 
Prior to the case, there was a range of pari passu clauses of different 
risk levels.135 After the case, all of the changes that take place push 
towards a single form of the clause—the low risk Rank version which 
is also the original version of pari passu. This movement to eliminate 
the variation is consistent with the Random Mutation model and not 
with the Rational Design model.136 Interestingly, the movement of 
these revisions toward the oldest variant of pari passu does not 
eliminate the risk of holdouts entirely, as the adoption of a Mandatory 
Law clause would do (see our categorization in Table I). Instead these 
market-wide effects appear to reflect a conscious decision in the 
market to return to the original version of pari passu. 
In sum, as of June 2016, the data on bonds issued by the pure 
sovereigns under New York and English law indicate the vast majority 
of new issuances are moving to the low risk Rank form of the clause 
and explicitly rejecting the ratable payments interpretation. And, 
invariably, this new language is the formulation prescribed by ICMA 
and endorsed by the IMF’s report, thus highlighting the importance of 
coordinating forces in spurring the movement in the market to the 
 
 133. Choi et al., supra note 15, at 31–34. 
 134. We performed a chi-squared test of the proportions of the different types of pari passu 
clauses for each year in our study time period as depicted in Figure 5. The chi-squared test 
indicated that the difference in the proportions for the different types of pari passu clauses across 
the years is significant (prob. = 0.000).  
 135. See Weidemaier et al., supra note 88, at 84–89. 
 136. See Choi et al., supra note 15, at 11. 
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original version of pari passu.137 
In our empirical paper, we also find that the following indicators 
correlate with the likelihood of a sovereign modifying the pari passu 
clause earlier rather than later: (a) representation by a law firm that is 
a market leader in terms of the volume of clients it represents;138 (b) 
location in Latin America, a region whose New York lawyers 
constituted the bulk of the participants at the two coordination 
meetings held in October 2014;139 and (c) whether the issuer had 
defaulted and restructured sometime over the past ten years.140 These 
factors, as we explain in Part IV, point towards the reasons for 
resistance to change being a combination of difficulties in coordinating 
change and the agency costs of lawyers and government debt managers 
being focused on the short-term goal of getting deals done.141 
E. Interviews with Market Players 
The data—showing extraordinary resistance to changes in pari 
passu language for the first three years of the study followed by a 
dramatic shift toward uniformity in pure sovereign issuances that is 
accelerating to the present day—reveal patterns of behavior that are 
confounding. To better understand this phenomenon, we turned first 
to the transactional lawyers who produced the contract terms and 
disclosure documents for the bonds in our data. As noted above, we 
hosted a conference at Columbia University Law School in early 
October 2014, shortly before the Fall IMF/World Bank meetings. We 
asked the gathered experts142 if they might help answer two core 
 
 137. The ICMA recommended clause from August 2014 reads as follows: 
  The Notes are the direct, unconditional and unsecured obligations of the Issuer and 
rank and will rank pari passu, without preference among themselves, with all other 
unsecured External Indebtedness of the Issuer, from time to time outstanding, 
provided, however, that the Issuer shall have no obligation to effect equal or ratable 
payment(s) at any time with respect to any such other External Indebtedness and, in 
particular, shall have no obligation to pay other External Indebtedness at the same time 
or as a condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice versa. 
INT’L CAPITAL MKT. ASS’N, STANDARD PARI PASSU PROVISION FOR THE TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS OF SOVEREIGN NOTES (2014), https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/ 
Resources/ICMA-Standard-Pari-Passu-Provision-August-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK9B-QY
JY].  
 138. Choi et al., supra note 15, at 25, 26. 
 139. Id. at 27. 
 140. Id. at 26. 
 141. See infra Part IV.A.1 and IV.A.2 respectively.  
 142. We explained that we would present our initial findings and hoped to gather their 
reactions. On hearing about the meeting, a number of other senior lawyers, bankers, and 
policymakers also asked to be included in the discussion. This resulted in a session with roughly 
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questions: First, what explains the failure of the sovereign debt industry 
to modify or amend pari passu now that multiple New York courts 
have handed down a ratable payments interpretation? And, second, 
what was the best strategy going forward to combat this problematic 
interpretation? 
We recorded what was said at the meeting and then had individual 
conversations or email exchanges with each of the attending lawyers, 
not all of whom responded.143 One theme was expressed by a number 
of the lawyers, and echoed in the conversations after the October 2014 
meeting. Sovereign clients were not yet comfortable making changes 
to their clauses. To pursue this theme, one of us then conducted a series 
of interviews with sovereign clients through senior officials at 
government debt offices. In Part III.E, we report on conversations with 
these government debt managers. Finally, we spoke to senior managers 
at fifteen investment firms that had specialties investing in government 
debt.144 Taken together, we spoke to over a hundred different 
individuals actively involved in the sovereign debt markets. 
1. Reasons for the Lack of Revision as of October 2014.  When 
interviewed during 2008–2011, these same lawyers gave two primary 
reasons for not modifying or amending their clauses in response to the 
ratable payments interpretation from Brussels in 2000. First, ratable 
payments was a bizarre interpretation from an inexpert court in 
 
thirty senior sovereign debt lawyers from both the private and public sectors.  
Our process of selection was simple. Using prior research on the role of lawyers in the 
sovereign debt market, we invited the senior partners from the ten leading firms in New York and 
London, the two leading jurisdictions for sovereign debt issuances. This gave an initial set of 
roughly twenty invitees. Three of the London lawyers who were not planning to be in the United 
States for the World Bank/IMF meetings later that week declined. However, a number of those 
invited asked whether they could bring colleagues from their firms. This resulted in a total of 
twenty-four attendees from major law firms. In addition, we invited senior counsel from the major 
official sector institutions such as the U.S. Treasury, the IMF and the Federal Reserve, and the 
major industry groups such as the Emerging Markets Traders Association and ICMA, which gave 
a total of thirty participants.  
 143. We also asked these questions at a meeting in Paris, in October 2014, with a number of 
European sovereign debt lawyers and policymakers. This meeting was organized by Rodrigo 
Olivares-Caminal of Queen Mary Law School. The format of this second conference followed the 
presentation plus audience questions format, and there were about a dozen lawyers and 
policymakers. We presented the same data and took notes on the responses, which were 
substantially similar to the ones we received in New York. 
 144. The majority of this latter set of interviews were done as part of a project that one us is 
doing with Anna Gelpern and Jeromin Zettelmeyer that is focused on the question of how market 
participants think (and talk) about the price impact of making contract modifications. See Gelpern 
et al., supra note 26, at 4–13.  
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Brussels made in the context of an ex parte hearing, and no New York 
or London court would rule in such a fashion. Second, modifying the 
clause would send a negative signal to any future court faced with the 
same interpretive issue: it would imply that the original boilerplate was 
ambiguous and thus make it more susceptible to the ratable payments 
meaning. 
In October 2014, neither of the prior explanations for inaction 
seemed valid. A New York federal district court had affirmed a ratable 
payments interpretation that twice was endorsed unanimously by the 
leading appellate court on business matters, followed by a denial of 
certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court despite arguments to the court in 
favor of reversal by four different nations, a Nobel laureate in 
economics, and a former Deputy Director of the IMF.145 So, why had 
the clause still not been modified? 
a. The Perfect Storm.  The initial response from the New York 
lawyers was that the New York interpretation was a function of 
unusual facts. “A perfect storm,” stated one senior attorney.146 
Argentina had apparently angered SDNY Federal District Judge 
Thomas Griesa to an unusual degree by the lack of respect it had shown 
him and his rulings over the decade or so that the litigation had 
proceeded.147 Argentina also made the strategic error of passing an 
explicit law that made the holdout creditors functionally junior to 
everyone else.148 But neither the trial nor appellate court clarified 
whether its decision was based on the unusual facts at issue—the law 
that Argentina passed, its unusually bad behavior, etc.—or on its 
 
 145. See supra notes 59–69 and accompanying text. 
 146. Audio tape: Columbia Law School Meeting (Oct. 2014) (on file with authors).  
 147. Accounts of how Argentina had angered and frustrated Judge Griesa are numerous. See, 
e.g., Tomás M. Araya, A Decade of Sovereign Debt Litigation: Lessons From the NML v. 
Argentina Case and the Road Ahead, 17 BUS. L. INT’L 83, 99 (2016) (“The 2012/2014 decisions 
from Judge Griesa and the Court of Appeals were undoubtedly connected with the Republic’s 
attitude of disrespect of the US judicial system . . . .”); see also Sheelah Kholhatkar, A Judge’s 
Rage Goes Ignored While Argentina Sidesteps Holdout Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG: 
BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-30/ 
argentina -vs-dot-holdout-hedge-funds-judge-griesas-rage-is-ignored [https://perma.cc/3MEZ-
JG2S] (discussing Judge Greisa’s anger toward Argentina); Alexandra Stevenson, Frustrated 
Judge Scolds Argentina but Does Not Hold It in Contempt, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 21, 
2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/frustrated-judge-scolds-argentina-but-does-not-
hold-it-in-contempt [https://perma.cc/N6BK-ZWH4] (discussing Judge Griesa’s frustration with 
Argentina). 
 148. See generally Weidemaier, supra note 63 (discussing the passage of the “Lock Law,” 
among other factors, that resulted in the court’s decision). 
CHOI GULATI  SCOTT IN PRINTER FINAL_KK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/2017  2:10 PM 
2017] THE BLACK HOLE PROBLEM 47 
finding that the explicit terms of the pari passu clause required 
Argentina to pay the holdouts ratably.149 If it had not been before, it 
now was clear that the clause lacked any plausible shared meaning, and 
there was a substantial risk that a court would resolve the linguistic 
uncertainty in favor of the ratable payments interpretation. Those two 
facts argued for repairing the clause promptly, regardless of any 
complaints about what the courts had done. That did not happen. 
Instead, these same lawyers devoted considerable efforts over the next 
two years pursuing every available avenue to have the ratable 
payments interpretation overturned in court. 
Our conclusion from the foregoing is that the lawyers across the 
industry—who worked diligently to generate support for numerous 
amicus briefs—must have believed it would be more difficult to 
persuade the industry to modify the boilerplate than to organize 
industry efforts to persuade the appellate courts to reverse the trial 
court. And the difficulty the proponents had in generating the industry-
wide litigation position opposing NML v. Argentina implies that it must 
be even more difficult to change certain boilerplate contract terms. But 
why? 
 b. British Courts Are Better.  The English lawyers had a different 
response from their U.S. counterparts. They claimed that no British 
court would ever rule in the same narrowly textualist fashion as the 
New York courts.150 Their confidence that, unlike the U.S. courts, a 
British court would look to market practice to rule out a ratable 
payments interpretation struck us as unwarranted, especially because 
 
 149. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 258–60, 264 n.16; see also 
Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 96, at 2–3 (discussing this aspect of the cases). 
 150. The appellate court opinion focused on the use of the word “payment” in Argentina’s 
pari passu clause but made little attempt to interpret the meaning of the text in harmony with the 
other words in the bond contract. NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 258–60. In reports issued under 
the auspices of the Bank of England, a group of the most eminent U.K. sovereign debt lawyers 
has on multiple occasions expressed its view in writing that U.K. courts would not make that 
mistake as a matter of English law. See FIN. MKTS. LAW COMM., ISSUE 79 – PARI PASSU CLAUSES 
22 (2005); FIN. MKTS. LAW COMM., ROLE USE AND MEANING OF PARI PASSU CLAUSES IN 
SOVEREIGN DEBT AS A MATTER OF ENGLISH LAW 1 (2014); FIN. MKTS. LAW COMM., ANALYSIS 
OF THE ROLE, USE AND MEANING OF PARI PASSU CLAUSES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT AS A MATTER 
OF ENGLISH LAW 10–11 (2015); see also Lachlan Burn, Pari Passu Clauses: English Law After 
NML v. Argentina, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 2, 2–9 (2013) (“There is almost no risk that English courts, 
faced with similar facts to NML v Argentina, would adopt the ‘payment’ interpretation.”); Tolek 
N. Petch, NML v Argentina in an English Legal Setting, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 266, 271 (2013) (“It 
follows that the approach endorsed by the Court of Appeals would be found wanting in an English 
court. There is therefore no reason to revisit standard pari passu wording in sovereign bond 
documentation issued under English law.”).  
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there was no clear market understanding of the clause’s meaning. A 
British court had been asked to interpret pari passu in Kensington 
International Ltd. v. Republic of the Congo but elected to sidestep the 
interpretive question.151 And, more recently, a former President of the 
U.K. Supreme Court opined on behalf of the holdout creditors that  
Judge Griesa’s ratable payments interpretation was correct under 
English contract law.152 Nevertheless, the British lawyers were 
unmoved: This episode was the result of the flaws in U.S. contract law, 
and many predicted that sovereign issuers, unhappy with the U.S. 
courts’ failure to examine market understandings, would now issue 
their bonds under English law rather than New York law.153 
Our data actually show that since October 2014, lawyers at the big 
British law firms have been altering the pari passu clauses in pure 
sovereign issuances governed by English law at roughly the same rate 
as their U.S. counterparts. We asked a subset of the British lawyers 
about the apparent inconsistency between their current actions and 
their prior assertions. They explained that despite the trivial risk of an 
incorrect interpretation by a British court, revisions were necessary 
because the standard documentation package for sovereigns issuing 
under foreign laws has now been changed. And clients want the 
standard package of clauses that is appropriate for their type of issuer. 
c. Our Clients Are Uncertain What to Do.  At the public discussion 
at Columbia Law School in October 2014, one participating lawyer 
raised the matter of client preferences. This lawyer, an industry group 
representative rather than a senior law firm partner, said quietly that 
 
 151. Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Congo [2003] EWHC (Comm) 2331 [91]; Kensington Int’l Ltd. 
v. Congo [2003] EWCA (Civ) 709 [13] (approving the decision); see also GLOBAL LAW 
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, ALLEN & OVERY, THE PARI PASSU CLAUSE AND THE ARGENTINE CASE 
10–11 (2012), http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/The%20pari%20passu%20
clause%20and%20the%20Argentine%20case.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5RS-RYKD] (discussing 
the case). 
 152. Former Lord Chief Justice Phillips, in his filing in support of the plaintiffs, wrote: 
  An English court would approach the problem of interpreting the [pari passu] 
clause with a wish, if possible, to give it the same meaning as that which it now bears 
under the law of New York . . . . I consider that the application of the principles of 
construction that apply under English law would result in it doing just that. 
Declaration of Lord Nicholas Phillips K.G., P.C. at 24, Red Pines LLC v. Republic of Argentina, 
No. 1:14-CV-09427 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016). As his declaration tells us, Judge Phillips was quite 
familiar with the NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina litigation, since the appeal in that case in 2011 
had come before him; although the pari passu interpretation issue was not raised. Declaration of 
Lord Nicholas Phillips K.G., P.C., supra, at 2.  
 153. The data we collected for this paper shows that, as of May 31, 2016, not a single issuer 
switched from New York to English law in the wake of Judge Griesa’s decision in December 2011. 
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perhaps one reason the clauses were not being modified was that some 
of the clients were not as confident as the lawyers in the room that the 
New York courts’ interpretation should be disavowed. A number of 
the participants agreed with this evaluation of their clients’ interests. 
In effect, we were told: “We haven’t been able to modify the clause 
because at least some of our clients are not convinced that is the best 
thing to do.” The inference was that while they agreed with the IMF 
and others that the courts’ decisions were incorrect,154 clients had not 
seen any strong negative reaction from the market to the pari passu 
decisions in NML v. Argentina, other than for Argentina itself.155 
Lee Buchheit, the dean of sovereign debt lawyers, explained why 
lawyers had not been able simply to delete the pari passu clause after 
NML v. Argentina: 
The principal drawback of a textual amputation of the clause is 
optical; it will leave a gaping hole in the term sheets, rating agency 
reports and tick-the-box summaries of the features of new debt 
issuances. Never having had a clear idea of what purpose the pari passu 
clause actually served in a cross-border debt instrument, underwriters 
and most investors will surely not have a clear idea of the implications 
of not having it. The guiding principle of the underwriting community 
in matters of documentation has always been that if it was good 
enough for my father, it’s good enough for me. Excising the clause 
altogether could therefore entail a significant educational initiative.156 
d. The Past Is Irrelevant.  Perhaps unsurprisingly given the drama 
caused by the pari passu litigation, a number of scholars have 
embarked on investigations into the original meaning of the clause in 
sovereign instruments.157 Both Sung Hui Kim and Anna Gelpern, each 
examining different sets of archival records,158 found evidence that the 
most likely understanding of the clause in a dispute over Nazi bonds in 
 
 154. For a discussion of the lawyer’s views, see infra Part III.E.1.d. 
 155. This lack of a negative market reaction perceived by the respondents is consistent with 
what the most recent research shows as well. See Faisal Z. Ahmed & Laura Alfaro, Market 
Reactions to Sovereign Litigation, 12 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 141, 154 tbl.1, 156 fig.3 (2017) (finding no 
abnormal negative returns from the NML case for any Latin American sovereign issuers’ bonds, 
other than Argentina itself). 
 156. Buchheit & Martos, supra note 87, at 492 (emphasis added). 
 157. See Anna Gelpern, Courts and Sovereigns in the Pari Passu Goldmines, 11 CAP. MKTS. 
L.J. 251, 254–56 (2016); Sung Hui Kim, Pari Passu: The Nazi Gambit, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 1, 243 
(2014). 
 158. Kim looked at diplomatic correspondence in the archives in Geneva. Kim, supra note 
157, at 242–50. Gelpern looked at transcripts of court decisions and related memos in archives in 
Geneva. Gelpern, supra note 157, at 253–54. 
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the 1930s was that it required ratable payments.159 Ben Chabot’s 
archival research into the infamous Black Eagle bonds issued by 
Mexico a century ago suggests that ratable payments was the most 
likely understanding of the clause at that time as well.160 
 Given that no one currently in the industry appeared to 
understand the meaning of the clause, we asked whether this historical 
evidence affected the thinking of contemporary lawyers. But the 
lawyers did not find the historical research to be relevant to the 
question of what the clause meant in the contemporary context. 
One eminent lawyer responded: 
The context today is completely different. You are dredging up 
meanings from a period where there was absolute sovereign 
immunity and where gunboats were the primary means of 
enforcement. We don’t have either of those things today.161 
That response brought us back to the original puzzle: If history was 
irrelevant to unearthing the meaning of the clause and there was no 
real contemporary understanding, why was the clause being used at 
all? 
2. The Courts Failed to Solve a Systemic Problem.  Despite the 
often-puzzling responses to our questions, a coherent story does 
emerge from the interviews with the leading lawyers in the sovereign 
bond industry. All of these lawyers share the strong view held by the 
official sector (the IMF, the U.S. Treasury, Paris Club, and others) and 
by ICMA that by undermining the ability of a defaulting sovereign to 
restructure its debt, the ratable payments interpretation was 
systemically harmful to the global economy in general and to the 
market for sovereign bonds in particular.162 Yet, the lawyers were 
reluctant to act on that belief because their commitment to the industry 
may have conflicted with the interests of certain clients. Taking their 
statements at face value, the U.S. lawyers viewed the risk of future 
 
 159. Gelpern, supra note 157, at 272–73; Kim, supra note 157, at 249–50. 
 160. Chabot & Gulati, supra note 47, at 235–36. Pablo Triana provides another historical 
examination of the origins of the pari passu clause. See generally Triana, supra note 47 (finding a 
pari passu clause in the bonds of a sub sovereign, the City of Edinburgh, in 1838). 
 161. Email from a meeting participant to Authors (Aug. 14, 2016) (on file with authors). 
 162. As an example, the Financial Times quotes the Nobel laureate Joe Stiglitz as saying of 
the case: “It’s a disaster for the world . . . . It sets an enormously bad precedent and will cause a 
lot of anxiety in the global financial system.” Robin Wigglesworth & Elaine Moore, Sovereign 
Debt: Curing Defaults, FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/90dc38fa-2412-
11e6-aa98-db1e01fabc0c [https://perma.cc/BM2Q-FENU]. 
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courts following the “precedent” of NML v. Argentina as small owing 
to the “perfect storm” that engulfed that case. Similarly, the British 
lawyers held the view that British courts would rely more heavily on 
industry “experts” than on the textualist jurisprudence of the Second 
Circuit. To be sure, one could interpret those beliefs as simply a 
justification for inaction in the face of perceived conflicts among client 
interests. Given those conflicts, the lawyers all agree that by applying 
the reigning principles of contract interpretation, the courts in NML v. 
Argentina failed to prevent systemic risk to the industry and left 
individual law firms in a quandary. How can a standard boilerplate 
contract adequately represent the interests of diverse clients with very 
different interests? 
 But the preceding story only explains why no efforts to reject 
the ratable payments gloss on pari passu occurred between June 2011 
and October 2014. Yet to be explained are two remaining puzzles: 
What then stimulated the dramatic increase in modified clauses in pure 
sovereign bonds issued shortly after October 2014? And why are the 
revisions that reject the ratable payment interpretation confined to 
pure sovereign issuances yet are virtually nonexistent in other bond 
categories, even though the same sovereigns whose clauses have been 
modified are often ultimately responsible for these other bond issues 
as well? Put differently, the risks posed by a ratable payments 
interpretation are the same or worse in those other bonds. 
F. Reports from the Clients 
In talking to the sovereign clients in twenty-seven different 
countries spanning three continents, ranging from AAA issuers to 
emerging market issuers, we focused on the managers at government 
debt offices. These debt offices are the primary clients in a sovereign 
bond deal, even though, in theory, investment banks are on the other 
side of the transaction. The lawyers for the investment banks on a 
sovereign deal tend to be what are called “designated underwriter’s 
counsel”: the sovereign debtor is the one who picks the counsel for the 
investment banks.163 Bradley and coauthors report that while the 
investment banks that manage a deal for the sovereign issuer tend to 
change from issuance to issuance, the designated underwriter’s counsel 
tends to stay the same over long periods of time.164 The logic is that 
these lawyers develop over time a deep understanding of the debtor 
 
 163. Bradley et al., supra note 58, at 153. 
 164. Id. 
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and can more easily prepare the relevant legal documents.165 While in 
some cases the sovereign debtor will have a different law firm as its 
primary counsel, it is often the case that the designated underwriter’s 
counsel is the only set of external lawyers for the deal. Further, it is the 
issuer who usually picks up the cost of the lawyers, whether they use 
two sets of lawyers or just one. 
What we report below is drawn largely from interviews one of us 
conducted for a project asking how government debt managers think 
about the pricing of contract provisions in sovereign debt.166 In 
particular, we asked the debt managers from the different debt offices 
two questions: First, what was their view of the risk posed by the 
ratable payments interpretation in NML v. Argentina for the type of 
clauses they were using? And, second, to the extent they had issued 
both sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds, what were their reasons for 
using different types of pari passu clauses in these different issuances? 
1. The Reasons That Might Induce Revision: Standard Practice and 
Investor Preference.  The sovereign debt lawyers had told us that many 
clients from the government debt offices were unsure of the best 
response to the NML v. Argentina decisions. The subset of clients 
interviewed uniformly confirmed that view. In every case, the debt 
managers were aware of the litigation by the hedge funds and that 
payments to the creditors holding restructured bonds had been frozen 
as a result. But in no case did these debt managers—over sixty senior 
officials across the various debt offices—seem to have a strong view of 
what they should do in response. We heard few statements of dismay 
at what the New York courts generally had done or Judge Griesa 
specifically had done.167 And relatedly, there was no expressed desire 
 
 165. Id.  
 166. See generally Gelpern et al., supra note 26 (describing interviews conducted with 
government debt managers between 2013 and 2017). 
 167. Our colleague, who ran three separate training sessions for the debt managers in 
Washington, D.C. during the period between the first Columbia Law meeting and the New York 
Federal Reserve meeting, said that the debt managers struck her as annoyed with the New York 
decisions (at least, more so than they were when we met with them some months later). In an 
email, she wrote: 
[T]he debt managers were angrier about the [NY] decisions than the lawyers-reaction 
was anger and disbelief, that is why I was invited to present to the debt managers as a 
group [three] times in different places (not to or with their lawyers), and that is why all 
those [debt managers] agreed to see us-they felt like they needed an independent 
understanding of the matter. But they also thought the problem was with the court and 
had to be fixed somewhere in a more centralized way, perhaps in the courts or in the 
legislature (this was [especially] true of non-lawyers and people from continental legal 
[systems]). The contracts were a fallback, risk management on the margins pending 
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to avoid New York law or New York courts in future sovereign 
instruments. 
The debt managers for the most part thought that the outcome of 
the NML v. Argentina litigation was bad. But they did not seem 
particularly concerned that the meaning of a key provision in many of 
their own bonds had been challenged. The explanation for not 
immediately changing their clauses was largely consistent across the 
debt offices: They would change their pari passu clauses when and if 
their lawyers told them that the standard boilerplate formulations were 
changing. A number of the debt managers emphasized the importance 
of having a lawyer who was in constant contact with the IMF legal 
department and was current on the latest improvements in the 
standard forms for sovereign bonds. Their preferences appeared to be 
driven by what the IMF considered to be “good practice.” But other 
than changes to the standard forms that were emanating from the IMF, 
the primary audience they were serving were the investors who were 
repeat purchasers of their bonds—specifically the dealers or bankers 
doing the initial placements. And those investors were not clamoring, 
or even murmuring, that they wanted the clauses changed one way or 
the other. 
 We pressed: What if the investors wanted a version of the clause 
that was even more susceptible to the ratable payments interpretation? 
Wouldn’t there be a negotiation over how many basis points that would 
cost? In their view, these questions revealed a fundamental 
misunderstanding on our part of the way prices for bonds were set and 
the relevance of contract terms such as pari passu to prices. In fact, 
there were no pricing decisions based on the “legal terms” of the 
document (the terms that the lawyers draft) in contrast to the “business 
terms” that impact the bonds’ selling price. 
 Legal terms may need to be changed because the relevant 
standard template has changed. But that, as one senior manager told 
us, is to ensure that the legal terms do not impact the price.168 There 
are terms that are relevant to the price—such as the currency, maturity, 
 
global solution. The [question] for [the debt managers] was whether their existing 
[contracts] expose them to such a degree that they cannot afford to wait. And for most, 
the answer was no. 
Email from a meeting participant to Authors (Jan. 10, 2016) (on file with authors). 
 168. See generally Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, How Much Is This Clause? Debt Managers 
on Pricing Bond Contract Terms 11–12 (Aug. 25, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (“Once the sovereign . . . settles on . . . price, the lawyers may be asked to 
‘paper the deal’ in line with this decision. . . . In other words, price-setting occurs apart from any 
variation in legal terms.”).  
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and governing law, the material that appears on the term sheet169—but 
legal terms such as pari passu and negative pledge are not part of that 
equation. The job of the lawyer, one of the first debt managers we 
interviewed explained, was to make sure that he or she was “irrelevant 
to the transaction.”170 The managers and their investors want to be able 
to set the price as a function of the “stuff that matters”—the economics 
of the sovereign debtor, not whether an obscure clause contained the 
word “payment.”171 
 Undeterred, we asked: “But even if the investors are not sure of 
what they want and don’t care about the pricing of the legal terms, 
don’t you want to draft your clauses so that you can ensure a smooth 
restructuring in the event that you ever go into default?” We were told 
that what we were suggesting was simply not done. The job of the 
lawyers was not to draft terms to protect the sovereign in case an 
adverse event occurred in the future. Instead, the lawyer’s sole task was 
to ensure that the right standard template was used. If the form is 
standard for a particular category of issuer, then neither side has to 
worry about the legal terms: both parties know that they have the 
standard package and neither side is trying to take advantage of the 
other in terms of the contract provisions. Pricing then can be done 
independently of the legal terms, one respondent explained, when 
neither side is worried about the lawyers inserting terms to help their 
clients deal with a future event such as a default. 
a. The Variation in the Clauses.  Given that the debt managers 
were emphasizing the importance of using “the standard” provisions, 
we next asked them what each meant by “standard.” We knew that 
standard did not mean identical, since there was considerable variation 
across issuers in terms of the precise wording of the clauses. But in 
addition—and here is where we focused our questions—many 
sovereigns had variations in the types of pari passu clauses they were 
using in their own bonds. Standard, to reiterate, didn’t seem 
particularly standard. So why the variation? Was it because the 
investors in one type of bond had made a different bargain with the 
debtors than in another bond? 
Our starting premise was wrong, we were told. There was no 
 
 169. See id. at 3, 11. 
 170. See generally id. (“The widely-held view was that, in the ideal world, non-financial 
(‘legal’) terms in sovereign bonds should be irrelevant.”).  
 171. Id. at 42. 
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bargaining between the issuer and the creditors over the type of pari 
passu clause that would be used. Instead, the clauses were the ones that 
were standard for that type of issuance. The standard template for pure 
sovereign issuances under New York and English law was changing 
and that was why the sovereign bond contracts under those laws were 
changing accordingly. The templates for the other types of issuance, 
such as sovereign guaranteed bonds or local law governed sovereign 
bonds, had not been addressed by the IMF/ICMA initiative, so those 
bonds were not changing. Moreover, the debt managers explained 
further, primary responsibility for anything but the pure sovereign 
issuances lay with a different set of bureaucrats and lawyers.172 To be 
sure, all of these obligations—and there are many hundreds of them in 
the period—would probably end up on the sovereign’s balance sheet if 
there were a sovereign default.173 But amending or modifying the 
clauses in those other bonds was not something that concerned the debt 
managers for the sovereigns, and it was not even something that they 
planned to discuss with their colleagues who did the other types of 
issuances.174 
None of the foregoing is meant to suggest that the managers were 
disinterested in learning about the clauses in their own bonds and what 
the variations were in the clauses within their countries’ issuances. 
They were curious about the implications of having one variation in a 
clause versus another, but nothing they learned about the different 
 
 172. See id. at 21 (explaining, in the context of drafting contracts for sovereign guarantees and 
issuances by sub-sovereigns, like regions, that there is often a strict division of responsibility with 
the debt managers for the sovereigns generally not coordinating with the managers for the quasi 
sovereigns about what terms to use). 
 173. On the issue of the large number of sovereign debt guarantees outstanding and the 
prospect of them all migrating to the sovereign’s balance sheet in the event of a crisis, see Elaine 
Moore & Jonathan Wheatley, Fears Mount Over Rise of Sovereign-Backed Corporate Debt, FIN. 
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/2f23839c-b320-11e5-8358-9a82b43f6b2f [https:// 
perma.cc/P6DE-2DDP]. 
 174. One senior debt manager for a country that had not, as yet in early 2016, changed its 
clauses explained: 
We will change the clauses in our foreign law bonds, the next time we do our issuance. 
Our outside lawyers know the IMF’s recommendations. The local law bonds are 
different. We have pari passu clauses in them. But we have only one lawyer in our 
department. We put pari passu clauses in because we wanted outside investors to buy 
local bonds–and investors are used to seeing these clauses. They have a check list. Pari 
passu, negative pledge, exchange listing . . . there are a set of things they look to see 
whether they are present. If so, they are okay with the bond. So, we put pari passu in. 
Seemed okay, since everyone else has it. [X country] also has it in their local law bonds. 
We are not a strong issuer; we need to make investors comfortable with our bonds. We 
only now noticed [after reading your article] that there are differences in the wording 
of our local law and foreign law pari passu clauses. We will change that. 
Email from debt manager to Authors (Aug. 14, 2016) (on file with authors). 
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levels of risk appeared to motivate them to remedy their clauses: that 
was just not how the process of changing standard boilerplate worked. 
They did, however, care about the IMF’s strong support for the new 
market standards and about being seen as good global citizens from the 
IMF’s perspective. In this vein, every one of the debt offices where we 
talked to managers who had not yet changed the clauses in their foreign 
law bonds told us that they would be changing soon. Their investors 
would want to have standard clauses, and they did not want to be on 
the IMF’s list of nonresponsive countries.175 
b. No Midstream Changes.  The final question posed to the debt 
managers concerned the wisdom of changing the pari passu provisions 
in their older bonds, given that their plan was to revise the pari passu 
clauses in their future bonds. In theory, this action would be favored 
by both issuers and their creditors assuming both feared that the older 
pari passu clauses could be exploited in the future by holdout creditors. 
If so, then why not change the clauses with a vote of the creditors 
during the good times when there were no holdout creditors: a vote 
between 50 percent and 75 percent of the bondholders could have 
deleted or modified the pari passu clauses in every one of the bonds at 
issue. 
Few of the debt managers seemed to have given this question 
much consideration.176 They were willing to consider changing new 
bond issues because the IMF, ICMA, and their outside counsel were 
telling them that the standard forms were changing. Moreover, this 
change was important for systemic reasons and they were willing to be 
good global citizens. But the IMF was asking them to revise the terms 
of their old bonds as well, and this was not something they were willing 
to do. Those changes would cost money that neither the sovereign debt 
 
 175. One debt manager explained why avoiding the IMF’s black list was important: 
The investors have not demanded it [change] yet. But they want the standard forms. 
And if the standard has changed, they will want the new standard. Also, we don’t want 
to be on the list of countries that have not fixed their contracts. We were on the list that 
the IMF put out. That was not good. But the bond we did was a small one, private 
issuance, and the investor did not ask. We tried to explain to the IMF, but they put us 
on the list [of those who had not changed] anyway. Not good. Next time, we will have 
changed. 
Email from debt manager to Authors (Aug. 14, 2016) (on file with authors). 
 176. The one debt manager who had considered doing an exchange of his old bonds appeared 
to wish to be seen as a leader and innovator in the world of debt managers. But, as of this writing, 
no real steps seem to have been taken in his office to engineer an exchange of the type we 
describe. 
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managers nor their investors were willing to pay.177 
2. Interviews with Fund Managers and Bankers.  We learned 
through the interviews with government debt managers that they 
looked primarily to their investor bases to discern whether there was a 
demand for changing boilerplate language. Thus, for our final set of 
interviews, we talked to fifteen of the financial firms that purchase, and 
sometimes litigate, sovereign debt contracts.178 To the extent these 
firms are holding sovereign bonds at the time of a crisis—and the firms 
held bonds in every recent sovereign debt crisis, including Argentina, 
Greece, Ukraine and Cyprus—they could see firsthand how the legal 
terms of the contract can matter a great deal once default looms. Our 
starting premise was that these firms were making decisions about 
which bonds to buy and sell—and, at least indirectly, what messages to 
convey to the debt managers—as a function of the contract provisions 
in the bonds.179 
As a general matter, the investors indicated that they did not 
consult their in-house lawyers for advice on which bonds to buy as a 
function of the legal terms.180 Legal terms, the investors said, are not 
relevant until very late in the game when the sovereign is trying 
desperately to avoid default.181 It is only when those efforts fail that the 
lawyers are asked to determine what the legal terms mean and whether 
they might provide an advantage or disadvantage in restructuring 
negotiations.182 This practice seemed inconsistent with rational 
investment strategy. If contract terms such as the form of the pari passu 
clause mattered ex post, in a near default state, ceteris paribus, they 
necessarily should matter ex ante when the bonds are issued as well.183 
Many of the players at the investment firms had quantitative 
backgrounds and so they understood the puzzle precisely. The 
explanation offered was the market reality. No one paid attention to 
anything but whether the bond had the “standard documentation”; 
that is, not until the very end, when everyone scrambled to find a good 
 
 177. This exhortation to change the terms of earlier-issued bonds came publicly from the 
director of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, at the June 2016 meetings of the Paris Club. Email from 
Isabelle Couet to Authors (2016) (on file with authors). 
 178. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 168, at 4, 50–51.  
 179. Id. at 1–2. 
 180. Id. at 50. 
 181. Id. at 50–51. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 51. 
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lawyer to tell them what their documents mean.184 In short, what 
matters to the investors at the front end of the transaction is that the 
boilerplate legal terms are standard. What is not relevant is how the 
legal terms in that standard might affect the price of the bond once the 
sovereign debtor approaches default. Consequently, it does not matter 
what precisely constitutes the standard legal terms. 
IV.  NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
We have been gathering data on the pari passu puzzle for more than a 
decade. At first glance, the empirical evidence collected—both 
quantitative and qualitative—seems puzzling and even confounding. 
Contract theory predicts that contract drafters will revise standard 
contract terms when faced with an interpretation adverse to their 
clients’ interests.185 That no more than a handful of corrective changes 
were made to the pari passu boilerplate for over three years after a 
federal court in New York endorsed the ratable payments 
interpretation, and roughly fourteen years after the Brussels decision, 
is perplexing. This is especially true because the drafting lawyers, and 
the entire sovereign bond industry, were nearly unanimous in 
condemning the series of judicial decisions that permitted the holdout 
creditors to prevail. Moreover, when clarifying revisions began to 
appear, they seemed to be prompted by two conferences held in New 
York in October 2014, rather than by the succession of adverse court 
decisions by the leading commercial courts in the United States. 
Adding to the mystery, the clarifying revisions that began to appear in 
many bond issues in late 2014 were limited to bonds issued directly by 
a sovereign. But virtually no such changes have yet been made to pari 
 
 184. Id. at 50.  
 185. The standard view in contract theory assumes that sophisticated parties have a better 
understanding of what the terms in their contracts mean than do courts, and thus have a 
corresponding incentive and capacity to revise those terms when necessary. For articulations of 
this view, see generally Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New 
Formalism, 75 MO. L. REV. 493 (2010) and Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1. The economics 
literature on standard form contracts suggests that boilerplate contract terms might sometimes be 
slow to change because of network or learning externalities—such as the value of having identical 
terms that everyone understands and can easily and accurately price and litigate because 
understanding their legal meaning has become widespread. That rationale may apply in the case 
of some types of boilerplate contract terms, but the black holes that we examine are clauses whose 
meaning has dissipated over time and whose pricing is nonexistent. The classic statement of the 
externality argument is in Kahan & Klausner, supra note 34, at 715–17. For an argument that the 
Kahan and Klausner argument does not apply to the pari passu context, see GULATI & SCOTT, 
supra note 10, at ch. 6. 
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passu clauses in bonds issued by sub-sovereigns even where those 
bonds are guaranteed by the same sovereigns whose own pari passu 
clauses have been repaired.186 
Notwithstanding the apparent contradictions, however, a story 
does emerge from the data. This is not the only story that explains the 
pari passu puzzle, but it is the only explanation that fits all the data 
sources collected. What follows, then, is first an effort to connect the 
dots by integrating both the quantitative and qualitative data. 
Thereafter, we address the question with which we began: What 
interpretive rule would better motivate courts to avoid systemic costs 
when asked to determine the legal meaning in encrusted boilerplate 
like the pari passu clause? 
A. More on Collective Action with a Heavy Dose of Agency Costs 
The evidentiary vacuum accompanying a black hole will deter 
contracting parties from simply unilaterally changing the language of 
the black hole after an aberrant court interpretation. First movers are 
unable to rely on contextual cues to discern the true meaning of the 
black hole clause, and the resulting uncertainty creates the risk of 
idiosyncrasy in a world that depends on standardization. To take just 
one example, where one party moves unilaterally but others continue 
to use the same term, the moving party faces a heightened risk that 
subsequent courts will view the change as confirming the first court’s 
interpretation. At the same time, the first mover also faces uncertainty 
about how the market will interpret the meaning of the revised clause. 
These inertia costs undermine the incentives to change the actual 
language of the clause until market participants are able collectively to 
send a signal rejecting the aberrant court interpretation and adopting 
a new market standard. 
1. The Coordination Problem: Private Versus Collective Interests.  
But how can parties in the market coordinate to act collectively? In 
certain markets, the coordination problem is made worse by the 
perverse incentives of critical market participants that hinder the 
 
 186. This is not the case with all the sovereigns in the data because some of the highest-rated 
issuers have no legal clauses at all in their pure sovereign bonds, but have legal clauses, including 
pari passu, in their sub-sovereign issuances. When we spoke to the debt managers of these issuers, 
however, they indicated that they would of course revise the pari passu clauses in their pure 
sovereign bonds if that were needed. But since they issue sovereign bonds without any legal terms, 
there is no problem with those bonds. When asked about their quasi-sovereign bonds, they 
generally expressed surprise. 
CHOI GULATI  SCOTT IN PRINTER FINAL_KK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/2017  2:10 PM 
60  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1 
market’s ability to overcome the collective action constraint. In the 
case of the sovereign debt market, the private interests of key 
participants—the elite lawyers and their clients, the representatives of 
the sovereigns and the investors—are inconsistent with those parties’ 
collective interests. The collective interests of the lawyers are to 
protect the industry and the market for sovereign bonds so that future 
issuances proceed smoothly and future business can grow. Yet, the 
private interests of the same set of lawyers are the mirror image of the 
interests of their de facto clients, the debt managers and the investment 
banks. And both sets of agents are subject to hyperbolic discounting: 
they are motivated to reduce the ex ante costs of a bond issue even 
where expected ex post costs are thereby increased by an even greater 
amount.187 This hyperbolic discounting problem exists whenever 
contracting parties pay more attention to the ex ante or front-end costs 
of the contract than to the ex post or back-end costs of a later default.188 
This, then, presents a problem that seems unique to boilerplate 
that has become a black hole. In the case of boilerplate that has been 
litigated or otherwise updated over time, for example by an industry 
group, and thus has a recognized contextual meaning, coordination is 
more tractable. The extant interpretation economizes on transaction 
costs by providing a focal point that aligns the parties’ expectations and 
thus permits them to solve the coordination problem more 
efficiently.189 Parties who participate in the sovereign debt market are 
involved in a mixed motive game. They coordinate on certain 
expectations but have conflicting interests on others. One way they 
align their expectations is through shared meaning. When the parties 
can communicate a shared meaning, experiments show that their 
“cheap talk” facilitates coordination.190 As Schelling famously noted, 
 
 187. Excessive discounting by agents thus leads to bond issuances that are less efficient than 
they could be. An efficient sovereign bond contract optimizes total contracting costs by trading 
off the ex ante or front-end costs of the contract and the ex post or back-end costs of default. For 
discussion, see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 
115 YALE L.J. 814, 822–25 (2006). 
 188. See id. at 822–39 (describing the costs when contracting parties prioritize front end or 
back end costs at the expense of the other).  
 189. The presence of a focal point seems to explain the market’s ability to coordinate within 
several years to reach the unanimity required among investors to revise collective action clauses. 
See generally Choi et al., supra note 15 (discussing focal points as a possible means of encouraging 
parties to coordinate). 
 190. See, e.g., Vincent Crawford, A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk, 
78 J. ECON. THEORY 286, 287 (1998) (“[W]hen players’ preferences are sufficiently close, 
communication via cheap talk can be informative.”). 
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when the problem is selecting one means of coordinating among many, 
focal point solutions stand out and attract the attention of both 
parties.191 Once announced, the focal point default economizes on 
costly precontractual communications: this function is especially 
valuable when the parties have different possible ways to coordinate, 
and there is no consensus on how to do so. 
This means of coordination is absent in the case of contractual 
black holes because any attempt at a collective revision to the clause 
first has to be “settled” among the key players, since those same private 
interests demand “standard” legal terms that reduce ex ante costs.192 
The absence of any focal point of meaning conflicts with the high 
demand for standard terms. If the term in question is one that is on a 
proverbial checklist, then it is the type of term that an investor expects 
to see in a sovereign bond.193 
This collective action problem is exacerbated by the agency costs 
that seem to pervade the sovereign bond market194 and that explain the 
apparent inconsistency between the expressions of distress over the 
pari passu litigation by the elite bar and their concomitant 
unwillingness or inability to effect any change in the standard 
boilerplate language. It also explains why there finally was substantial 
movement to revise the pure sovereign issuances in late fall 2014 and 
why this apparently coordinated decision to revise pari passu was not 
followed in the quasi-sovereign bonds that were issued during the same 
time frame. In what follows, we support the collective action/agency 
cost story by describing in more detail the respective individual and 
collective interests of each of the principal parties. 
 
 191. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–55 (1980). 
 192. In short, the issuers faced a tradeoff: They could either insert language shutting down the 
hedge funds who might buy up the bonds in times of future distress, but in doing so their action 
could be construed as watering down a pledge that purchasers had come to expect as a promise 
of equal treatment. Ex ante, the issuers did not know which move would affect the price of their 
bonds more. So they adopted a wait and see attitude. Eventually, once they had some assurance 
that most other sovereign issuers would change the language, meaning they would be at no 
competitive disadvantage, the big issuers at least agreed to a change. 
 193. One way to understand the stickiness of terms that make it on to the checklist is to see 
them as category defining terms. Scholars in sociology have long observed the importance 
attached, even by sophisticated market actors, to whether products fit certain defined 
categories—for example, a vehicle is not a car unless it has four wheels, and only if it is a car will 
it get rated by car magazines and evaluated by car experts and sold by car dealers and so on. See, 
e.g., Ezra W. Zuckerman, The Categorical Imperative: Securities Analysts and the Illegitimacy 
Discount, 104 AM. J. SOC. 1398, 1398–1406 (1999). 
 194. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at ch. 10. 
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2. The Incentives of the Elite Lawyers.  The private interest of each 
of the lawyers who dominate the sovereign bond market is to process 
bond issues at the least ex ante cost and as quickly as possible, 
notwithstanding expected default costs.195 This single-minded focus on 
reducing front-end contracting costs is simply a reflection of the fact 
that the “legal terms,” for which the lawyers are responsible and that 
form the standard boilerplate, are seen as immaterial to both sellers 
and buyers in the initial pricing of the bonds. Thus, any change in the 
risk of default that results from a change in the legal terms of the 
contract is ignored by both the debt managers, who act as agent for the 
sovereign, and the investment bank, which serves as agent for the 
investors. In short, the ex ante legal meaning of pari passu is irrelevant 
to both sides of the transaction as is the fact that this particular clause 
has no understood ex ante meaning: it is a black hole with random 
variations that are meaningless encrustations. This makes pari passu a 
much more difficult problem to repair once the inertia costs of an 
aberrant interpretation become salient. Nevertheless, the pari passu 
clause remains a part of the bonds’ contractual boilerplate because it is 
part of the “standard form,” and standardization is valued because it 
reduces ex ante contracting costs.196 
When Elliott Associates succeeded in having a court adopt the 
ratable payments interpretation in Brussels in 2000, the elite bar was 
outraged but not because any lawyer’s individual interests were 
imperiled. As we know, their clients did not care. The lawyers were 
outraged, in unison with the public sector and other collective groups, 
because they saw that the ratable payment interpretation imperiled the 
health of the industry itself. If bonds in default cannot be restructured, 
then over time the pressure from the vulture funds whenever a 
sovereign faces default will reduce the demand for issuing debt in this 
form and the robust market for sovereign bonds will be negatively 
impacted. This means a decline in a lucrative legal business. The 
collective interests of the lawyers who dominate this industry is to 
maintain a thriving sovereign bond market where bond issues are 
produced on an assembly line.197 And this way of doing business was 
threatened.  
 
 195. Id. 
 196. For discussions of the value of standardized provisions, see Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, 
at 286–88 and Kahan & Klausner, supra note 34, at 719–29.  
 197. For discussion of the three-and-a-half-minute transaction and the mass production of 
boilerplate contracts, see GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at ch. 10. See also Richman, supra note 
33, at 79–82 (drawing an analogy to Henry Ford’s production line for cars).  
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At the same time, these lawyers had no incentive to revise the 
standard terms for their individual clients. The debt managers for the 
sovereigns do not care about the legal terms at the time of issuance: 
they do not regard the legal terms as relevant to the initial pricing of 
their bonds because they know that the investment banks charged with 
marketing the bonds only care about having the standard form. 
Moreover, the clients affirmatively discourage individualized 
deviations from the boilerplate formulation because nonstandard legal 
terms make the initial issuance more difficult and costly to get to 
market. Thus, the lawyers repeatedly demanded that the state solve the 
problem but did nothing themselves other than to offer empty 
platitudes about why they failed to act.198 
This saga continued for nearly 15 years until one lawyer at the 
October 2014 Columbia conference committed a gaffe by telling the 
truth: “We don’t know how to respond to this problem because the 
interests of our clients are not identical, and many clients do not ask 
for or want any change in the standard legal terms.”199 The evidence 
points to the fact that this session, and the subsequent meeting of an 
elite subset of the same basic group a few weeks later, was the impetus 
for coordinating a move to a revised (though equally ambiguous) pari 
passu clause. The lingering agency problem for the elite bar is that the 
de jure client is the “true sovereign”—the people or at least the duly 
constituted government—and not just the debt managers. And it is not 
at all clear that those interests are advanced by treating all sovereigns 
as having the same default risk and issuing standardized boilerplate for 
sovereign bonds despite the apparent variance in the probability of a 
future restructuring between developed countries and developing 
nations. 
3. The Sovereigns’ Incentives.  The sovereign’s interests are also 
skewed by an agency problem. Sovereigns have a long-term interest in 
having the capacity to restructure their debt. But because they have not 
incentivized their agents correctly, those interests are 
underrepresented in the state’s bureaucracy. Thus, the debt managers 
care primarily about what the investors claim to care about—the 
 
 198. The exception in this story should be the restructuring lawyers and perhaps their clients. 
These lawyers are going to face the consequences of having suboptimal contract terms. So, one 
should predict that when they have the opportunity to remedy terms after a restructuring, they 
will. And, as reported, we see precisely that—the bonds that have the first changes tend to be 
those in restructurings. See Choi et al., supra note 15, at 26. 
 199. Audio tape: Columbia Law School Meeting, supra note 146. 
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business terms that they believe do influence bond prices—and they 
want the legal terms to remain unchanged and uncontroversial so as to 
secure the best initial price at the lowest issuance cost.200 In short, the 
sovereign’s agents engage in hyperbolic discounting because that is 
what they are paid to do. Nevertheless, theory predicts that some 
(many) sovereigns will have issued bonds prior to the revisions to pari 
passu that risk imposing substantial costs on their country’s citizens in 
the future. 
4. The Investors’ Incentives.  But why don’t the investors who buy 
the bonds care about the ability to restructure in the event of default? 
This is a difficult question, but one hypothesis is that it is too costly to 
try and match a given sovereign with the optimal clause. Some 
sovereigns may present a measurable default risk while others may not, 
and the information to make particularized ex ante calculations is 
costly to acquire, especially in a world of encrusted boilerplate of 
uncertain meaning. The same holds for the information needed to 
quantify how changes in pari passu will alter the present value of future 
repayment if default occurs. A rationalist skeptic might ask: Why is the 
market so imperfect? Behavioral theory may explain part of the answer 
as being a function of excessive discounting.201 Another consideration 
is the fact that this is a liquid market where bonds can easily be resold 
on the secondary market. In such an environment, the business terms 
and the bond’s rating are a good enough proxy for future default risks 
especially where boilerplate terms have been stripped over time of 
comprehensible legal consequences. 
But the preceding does not answer one remaining question: If Jay 
Newman, Elliott’s legendary legal arbitrageur, prides himself on 
reading the bond contracts once default looms in order to capture rents 
as a holdout creditor, then doesn’t it follow that he and other hedge 
fund hotshots will read the bond contracts at the time of issuance as 
well?202 This implies that there should be arbitrage in the primary 
 
 200. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 168, at 11–12. 
 201. See Steffen Andersen, Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau & E. Elisabet Rutström, 
Discounting Behavior: A Reconsideration, 71 EUR. ECON. REV. 15, 15–16 (2014); Shane 
Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A 
Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 351, 393–94 (2002). 
 202. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 158–59; see also Michelle Celarier, Mitt Romney’s 
Hedge Fund Kingmaker, FORTUNE (Mar. 26, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/03/26/mitt-romneys-
hedge-fund-kingmaker [https://perma.cc/T6LU-US7B] (describing Elliott’s strategy of figuring 
out what the documents actually say).  
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market where smart investors selectively buy bonds based on their 
reading of the legal terms: even if the initial purchasers do not plan to 
be there when default looms, they know that Jay Newman and others 
will pay a higher price for the bonds with better contract terms in that 
near-default scenario.203 To be sure, investors act as though the risk of 
a default without the ability to restructure is too remote to affect initial 
price. But will the market adjust if hedge funds engage in arbitrage ex 
ante as well as ex post? Perhaps not. The tradeoff between the ex ante 
moral hazard risk of a future restructuring and the ex post returns of a 
successful restructuring to creditors is difficult to assess. So long as the 
initial investors only bear some of the price risk caused by legal 
arbitrage, it still may be rational for them to buy bonds without 
discriminating among legal terms that influence the costs of default. 
5. The Role of the Public Sector and Industry Associations.  The 
IMF, the Paris Club, the Institute of International Finance, ICMA, and 
so on only have collective interests. Why was it so hard to coordinate 
with the leading lawyers to solve the problem much earlier? The best 
inference from the data is that the pari passu clause was emptied of any 
context that could help determine its most plausible meaning, thus 
increasing the risks of error to actors who were motivated to revise 
their boilerplate. What should they do without any context that could 
point to a plausible meaning to use as a benchmark?204 Under these 
conditions, the collective interests believed that the expected costs of 
litigation in the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court (discounted by 
the probability of prevailing) were lower than the costs of coordination 
given that the elite members of the bar were individually reluctant to 
do anything. Thus, so long as the courts could be expected to get it right 
in the end, coordination costs were too onerous. 
 
 203. There are a number of recent research papers showing that key contract terms such as 
governing law come into play in near-default scenarios. See, e.g., Andrew Clare & Nicolas 
Schmidlin, The Impact of Foreign Governing Law on European Government Bond Yields 2–5 
(Mar. 8, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2406477 [https://perma.cc/3APL-G6UE]; Julian Schumacher, Marcos Chamon & 
Christoph Trebesch, Foreign Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs? 1–5 
(Mar. 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/113199 [https:// 
perma.cc/7GWL-7DSE]. 
 204. It is useful to compare a clause such as pari passu where the range of meanings is unaided 
by any context evidence with ordinary vagueness. For example, a contract that calls for the 
delivery of 100 “dark red” Macintosh apples is vague because the term does not precisely 
determine what constitutes a conforming apple; how dark red must the apples be? Nevertheless, 
in such a case courts can revert to context to resolve the meaning of the contract term. Pari passu 
lacked any such context to aid in fixing its meaning.  
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This then leaves the last part of the story. How did they get it 
done? Recall that solving the collective action problem not only 
required a willingness to consider the collective interest over private 
interests but the parties had to coordinate around a common 
formulation in order to substitute a new standard term in place of the 
defective one. At the Columbia conference in October 2014, many of 
the elite lawyers were openly critical of the clarification proposed by 
the IMF-led process. Yet, once they were invited to a second meeting 
limited to the most elite among them and asked to participate in solving 
a common problem of global significance, the attendees quickly and 
easily reached an agreement and revisions began to appear from that 
point onward. Is it really true that status and flattery were all that was 
needed to do the trick? Was the Columbia conference an important 
first step for the elite bar to recognize that they all shared the same 
private and collective interests?205 Our data cannot answer these last 
questions but we do know that the lawyers who were in the room at 
both the Columbia and New York Federal Reserve meetings in 
October 2014 represented the pure sovereign issuers doing offerings 
under New York and English law.206 And that is precisely where the 
standard revision has now become the norm, whereas other lawyers 
who were not invited to the meeting with the IMF—often partners at 
the same law firms as the elite cohort—represent subsidiary sovereign 
interests that have yet to coordinate around a revision that rejects the 
ratable payments gloss. 
B. What Should Courts Do with Contractual Black Holes? 
The standard interpretive principle courts are instructed to use in 
ascertaining the meaning of a contract term to which both parties have 
manifested assent is to look for the shared intent of the contracting 
parties.207 Intent, in turn, is determined both objectively and 
prospectively: A party is taken to mean what its contract partner could 
 
 205. One of the key policymakers from the U.S. Treasury told us in January 2016 that, looking 
back, persuading ICMA to be involved was especially important. ICMA was, at the time, trying 
to demonstrate to the market that it was a key actor and worth joining. ICMA, in other words, 
had its own incentives to show the market that it was an important player and could engineer big 
changes. But our data show that the ICMA publication of draft clauses, which were released 
officially in August 2014 but drafts of which were circulated as early as January 2014, was not 
enough to induce change on the market. The catalysis appears to have occurred in October 2014.  
 206. Within this group, the lawyers representing Latin American sovereigns were 
disproportionately represented as they tend to do issuances primarily under New York law. 
 207. Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2009).  
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plausibly believe it meant when the parties contracted.208 Textualist 
theories undergird the New York courts’ doctrines of contractual 
interpretation that are designed to uncover the objectively reasonable, 
ex ante intent of the parties. Textualist jurisdictions, such as New York, 
use a “hard” parol evidence rule that gives presumptively conclusive 
effect to merger or integration clauses,209 and, in the same spirit, this 
approach bars context evidence suggesting that parties intended to 
impart nonstandard meaning to language that, read alone, is 
unambiguous.210 
There is a powerful justification for giving boilerplate terms in 
commercial contracts their plain or standard dictionary meaning: 
creating standard vocabularies for the conduct of commercial 
transactions is a valuable state function.211 When a phrase has a set, 
easily discoverable meaning, parties who use it will know what the 
phrase requires of them and what courts will say the phrase requires. 
By insulating the standard meaning of terms from deviant 
interpretations, this strategy preserves a valuable collective good, 
namely a set of terms with clear, unambiguous meanings that are 
already understood by the vast majority of commercial parties.212 
But the preceding exposes a dilemma that courts confront when 
applying a plain meaning analysis to standard boilerplate such as the 
pari passu clause: the interpreter must somehow distinguish between 
meaningful language and empty boilerplate. Moreover, this problem is 
not solved simply by arguing that courts should instead adopt a 
contextualist interpretive style.213 Contractual black holes are 
 
 208. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 568–69. 
 209. Merger clauses are given virtually conclusive effect in New York. See Tempo Shain Corp. 
v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Ordinarily, a merger clause provision indicates 
that the subject agreement is completely integrated, and parol evidence is precluded from altering 
or interpreting the agreement.”); Norman Bobrow & Co. v. Loft Realty Co., 577 N.Y.S.2d 36, 36 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (“Parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a written contract 
containing a merger clause.”). 
 210. The New York courts’ plain meaning rule addresses the question of what legal meaning 
should be attributed to the contract terms that the parol evidence rule has identified: when words 
or phrases appear to be unambiguous, extrinsic evidence of a possible contrary meaning is 
inadmissible. For a discussion of the different parol evidence rules and their effect on contract 
drafting, see generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 
YALE L.J. 926 (2010). 
 211. See Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
847, 853–56 (2000). 
 212. Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, at 286–88. 
 213. Contextualists argue that formal interpretive rules that exclude certain categories of 
extrinsic evidence deprive the fact finder of indispensable information relevant to deciding the 
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acontextual: the variations in language among different version of the 
clause are essentially random and thus context evidence does not aid 
in determining plausible meanings. This suggests that both textualist 
and contextualist courts are well advised to interpose a further step 
when interpreting standardized terms in commercial contracts. 
 At a minimum, courts should be open to arguments that, as a 
matter of law, the clause in question has been emptied of meaning and 
functions as a black hole in the boilerplate. To be sure, the moral 
hazard risk of false claims by a party who has been disadvantaged by 
fate argues for a strong presumption against the existence of a black 
hole. But there should be an opportunity to admit evidence sufficient 
to overcome that initial presumption against encrustation. The 
evidence described above is illustrative of the proof that the parties 
alleging encrustation might proffer. Has the clause been repeated by 
rote over many years, without having been tested in litigation, where 
repetition has robbed the term of any obvious conventional meaning? 
Has the term been embedded in layers of legal jargon such that its 
intelligibility is substantially reduced and variations in the formulation 
of the term across contracts have no apparent significance?214 Is a 
historic or original meaning of the term accessible in a fashion that 
makes sense in the contemporary context and are contemporary 
commercial actors aware of that meaning? Is there credible evidence 
that the particular provision was priced at the original issue stage?215 
 
case and thus can distort the court’s assessment of what the parties meant by their agreement. 
Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract Interpretation 
as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 36 (2014). Contextualist jurisdictions, such as 
California, carry this view to its logical limit and reject the notion that words in a contract can 
have a plain or unambiguous—context free—meaning at all. Id. By the same logic they favor a 
soft parol evidence rule. Id. at 37. Here the test for integration admits extrinsic evidence 
notwithstanding an unambiguous merger clause or, absent such a clause, notwithstanding the fact 
that the writing appears final and complete on its face. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas 
Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968) (“[R]ational interpretation requires at least 
a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the 
parties.”); Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (admitting parol evidence to vary terms 
of deed on ground that “[e]vidence of oral collateral agreements should be excluded only when 
the fact finder is likely to be misled”). 
 214. A critic might ask whether what we call “layers of legal jargon” or “encrustation” is being 
dismissed unfairly as meaningless. After all, these encrustations, like the insertion of the word 
“payment” into the pari passu clause sometime in the 1970s, were presumably chosen by a lawyer 
to make the clause clearer or more advantageous for the client. If the variation was consciously 
chosen, is it not the very opposite of meaningless jargon? Our response is that the key is whether 
the underlying core clause has any shared meaning. If not, then adding language intended to 
clarify increases rather than reduces the linguistic uncertainty infecting the core clause. 
 215. Based on what we have learned, it probably does not mean much if we do not find a 
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If a court finds strong evidence of rote usage and encrustation in 
standard boilerplate, the presumption of shared meaning is no longer 
apt: when encrusted boilerplate is repeated by rote for many years 
without legal challenge, and no party has reason to know a different 
meaning attached to the clause by another party, the clause has become 
a legal black hole. What we have learned about black holes from our 
study of the pari passu litigation and its aftermath is that third parties 
can play a constructive role in facilitating coordination by the market 
on a new standard term. A court intent on facilitating coordination by 
groups such as the IMF could adopt the presumption that the evidence 
of a black hole implies that the parties attached different meanings to 
the term in question. This presumption invokes the common law rule 
that if parties have attached different meanings to a term neither party 
is bound by the meaning of the other unless at the time of contracting 
one party did not know or have reason to know the meaning of the 
counter party, who in turn did know or have reason to know the 
meaning of the first party.216 Applying this principle to the NML v. 
Argentina case, and assuming neither party knew or had reason to 
know of the other’s different ex ante understanding, a court could find 
that neither party’s interpretation of pari passu was legally relevant. 
Reading the clause out of the contract in this way permits textualist 
courts to maintain their commitment to plain language interpretation 
and also allows contextualist courts to continue to invite extrinsic 
evidence of the meaning of contested terms. 
To be sure, the state could advance the parties’ interest in solving 
their collective action problems in other ways, say, by engaging in just 
the sort of “public/private” coordination efforts that ultimately 
succeeded in resolving the pari passu saga. In general, regulatory 
solutions of that sort are preferable to a court’s resolution of the black 
hole conundrum because they operate generally and not just in the 
particular case. For this reason, among others, the true lesson of our 
study may be that the IMF and other groups that constitute the “official 
sector” may be better able than courts to solve these problems over 
time as they gain experience and become more confident in their 
 
pricing effect. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 168, at 11–12. But if we do find an effect, it 
probably means that the clause was intended to have a specific discernible meaning. 
 216. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 201(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). In the case 
where one party does not know the meaning of the other and the other does know or have reason 
to know the meaning of the first party, the term is interpreted in accordance with the meaning 
asserted by the first party. See id. § 201(2). 
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methods.217 If this is so, then even though the pari passu case shows that 
the intervention of a public authority is sometimes required to solve 
contractual disputes that have third-party effects, relying on the courts 
rather than private ordering to craft the solution may not always be the 
best choice. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have sought to support three claims. First, 
contractual black holes can exist as a by-product of the standardization 
of boilerplate in commercial markets. The boilerplate production 
process can generate random variations in language that are not the 
product of rational contract design. Nonetheless, these variations 
persist and are cemented over time as part of the market standard. 
Second, while black holes often remain for many years as relatively 
harmless surplusage, they can generate substantial social costs once 
litigation results in an interpretation that introduces inefficiencies into 
the market. These encrustations then invite opportunistic litigation and 
require costly collective efforts to repair the now vulnerable terms. 
Third, those costs are a function of the inherently greater inertia costs 
that result from an aberrant interpretation of a black hole term and the 
greater difficulty market players face in overcoming the resulting 
collective action problem. 
 We have used the pari passu litigation as a prototypical exemplar 
of the substantial costs that result from inefficient interpretations of 
black holes, costs that are exacerbated when the interpretations are 
advanced by contractual arbitrageurs, such as Elliott Associates and 
NML Capital, Ltd. Indeed, the costs of pari passu in taxpayer payouts 
to holdout creditors are already enormous and likely to increase even 
further.218 As we write this paper, Venezuela is on the verge of default 
on upwards of $75 billion of debt.219 Among its bonds are those with 
different versions of the pari passu clause, including the low risk Rank 
version and the high risk Rank in Payment version. Comparisons of the 
 
 217. We are grateful to Lisa Bernstein for this observation. 
 218. Among the largest of these payouts are the recoveries of holdouts against Argentina in 
March 2016, with recoveries estimated in the 1000 percent range for some hedge funds. See Martin 
Guzman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Opinion, How Hedge Funds Held Argentina for Ransom, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/opinion/how-hedge-funds-held-
argentina-for-ransom.html [https://perma.cc/U6MR-SACR].  
 219. E.g., Dimitra DeFotis, 2 Venezuela Bond Strategies as Debt Default Looms, BARRONS: 
EMERGING MKTS. DAILY (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.barrons.com/articles/2-venezuela-bond-
strategies-as-debt-default-looms-1490202932 [https://perma.cc/YH27-6PJK]. 
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price differentials among the bonds that isolate differences other than 
the contract provisions suggest that holdout activity is driving the 
widening spreads among the bonds, with an increasingly higher yield 
for the low risk Rank version that provides less opportunity for 
holdouts.220 Here the resulting social cost is a function of the fact that, 
despite the revisions that are common in new bonds issued after 
October 2014, few if any sovereigns have sought to modify the terms of 
their older bonds. 
A natural question to ask is whether our study is idiosyncratic. 
Perhaps the pari passu clause is a unique example of the costs of 
encrustation. We do not have a good answer to this question, other 
than to note the number of recent papers exploring similar problems 
in other standard markets221 and that within the sovereign debt contract 
itself there are other terms that are potential black holes. An example 
described elsewhere is the standard negative pledge clause, a clause 
that is on the standard checklist, and appears in almost every sovereign 
bond. Yet, a negative pledge term seems to have little contemporary 
meaning since sovereigns stopped pledging assets as a backstop to their 
debt more than seventy-five years ago.222 And even if they did pledge 
assets, what would it mean to have pledges that rank equally in a 
context where seizing a foreign sovereign’s assets in its own country is 
impossible in the modern era? 
Outside of the sovereign bond context we have seen suspected 
black holes similar to pari passu in local municipal bonds in the United 
States. A frequent practice with these municipal bonds, of which tens 
of billions of dollars are outstanding, is that they are backed by pledges 
of revenues of the local governments.223 Sometimes the pledges of 
 
 220. See Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati & Steven Ongena, Pricing Contract Terms 
in a Crisis: Venezuelan Bonds in 2016, CAP. MKTS. L.J. 540, 546 (2016) (comparing the pricing on 
Venezuelan sovereign bonds with similar maturities, but differing pari passu and collective action 
clauses); see also John Dizard, ‘Complete Chaos in Caracas’ Invites Vulture Fest, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 
2, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/432c9f02-70f0-11e6-9ac1-1055824ca907 [https://perma.cc/ 
4XHZ-WGMG] (discussing how vulture funds have begun to find investing in Venezuela 
attractive).  
 221. See supra note 17. 
 222. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Contractual Arbitrage, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Eric Brousseau, Jean-Michel Galmant & Jerome 
Sgaard eds., forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 21–22), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=6304&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/VC3Y-QLKN]. 
 223. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s bonds, that are in distress as of this writing, provide 
an illustration of the range of these pledges. See Tim Worstall, The Truly Horrible and Ghastly 
Mess of Puerto Rico’s Bond Issuance, FORBES (May 6, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
timworstall/2017/05/06/the-truly-horrible-and-ghastly-mess-of-puerto-ricos-bond-
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revenues are of the general tax revenues, and sometimes there are 
specific streams of revenues from a utility or similar entity. An issue 
that has become salient in the context of the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, which has over $50 billion of these types of bonds at risk of 
default, is how these revenues can be enforced if the Commonwealth 
or some other such entity defaults. Would a federal or state judge be 
willing to issue an order asking the government in question to stop 
doing repairs on its roads or providing basic services to inhabitants in 
order to pay a contract arbitrageur? Alternatively, is there a risk that 
the court would order the local government to raise taxes to pay the 
creditors? And what if the inhabitants simply moved to avoid the 
taxes? These kinds of revenue pledges are ubiquitous in the U.S. 
municipal bond market—and there are many variations in how they 
are formulated, variations that are supposedly priced224—and yet, no 
one seems to know how they would work. 
In short, black holes do exist in standard boilerplate contracts that 
are used all over the world to regulate important markets. And the 
principal lesson of the pari passu saga is that once a black hole is 
discovered and then exploited by a contractual arbitrageur, the social 
costs of coordinating a move to solve the problem collectively can be 
extremely high. 
issuance/#7405bea54224 [https://perma.cc/9YF8-8GMR]. For a general overview of municipal 
bonds, see CRAIG L. JOHNSON, MARTIN J. LUBY & TIMA T. MOLDOGAZIEV, STATE AND LOCAL 
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: POLICY CHANGES AND MANAGEMENT 12–14 (2014) and NEIL 
O’HARA, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 36 (6th ed. 2012).  
224. See Mark D. Robbins & Bill Simonsen, Municipal Securities, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 795, 797–98 (Jack Rabin ed., 2003). 
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APPENDIX  
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Figure 2: Dollar Amount of Issuances for All Issuers Excluding those 
Issuers with a Rank Initial Pari Passu Clause  
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Figure 5: Percentage of Sovereign Issuances by Year with Specific Type 
of Pari Passu Clause  
 
